[TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional in TLS 1.3 (#676)
Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> Sat, 08 October 2016 01:03 UTC
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From: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 08 Oct 2016 01:03:21 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional in TLS 1.3 (#676)
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There has been a lot of discussion lately about post-handshake messages that do not contain application data and how to handle them. This PR is an attempt to make the story more explicit by adding a new post_handshake extension to TLS 1.3. Supporting all types of post-handshake messages can require extra complexity and logic, even when the features that these messages enable are not needed. Some types of connections/implementations don't need to support key updates (some unidirectional connections), session tickets (pure PSK implementations) and post-handshake client auth (most browsers). These are all currently SHOULDs in the spec and they don't need to be. In order to simplify the logic around dealing with post-handshake messages, this proposal makes support for each of these modes explicit via a new handshake extension. This change also makes the path to introducing other types of post-handshake messages in future drafts more explicit. PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/676 Nick
- [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional in … Nick Sullivan
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Nick Sullivan
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Nick Sullivan
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Tom Ritter
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Nick Sullivan
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Mike Bishop
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] Making post-handshake messages optional… David Benjamin