Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuites
Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Tue, 21 August 2018 18:11 UTC
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuites
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> On Aug 21, 2018, at 1:29 PM, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote: > > You're going to have to change what you do anyway—rather than arguing with us why not bypass us entirely? TLS is not just a WWW protocol. Other transport security use-cases should not have to justify their existence. It is, of course, appropriate to make sure that proposed TLS code-points that cater to specialized needs are well thought out and include suitable security considerations. It is also reasonable to check that the requirements are not already met without the proposed code-points. I am concerned that we are going beyond that to questioning the legitimacy of the use-cases. IPsec is rarely a practical alternative to TLS. That said, TLS-LTS (a TLS 1.2 profile) may well be a good long-term choice where TLS 1.3 is not sufficiently compatible. As for TLS 1.3, it is indeed missing both null encryption and null authentication ciphers. I've not seen any evidence that their presence in TLS 1.2 has led to either widespread support or non-negligible accidental misuse. TLS in SMTP is (still) largely unauthenticated opportunistic TLS, and in almost all cases certificate verification errors get ignored by sending MTAs. When doing opportunistic unauthenticated TLS, Postfix goes a step further and prefers ADH/AECDH cipher-suites (with TLS <= 1.2), since any presented certificates will be ignored. The null auth ciphers are automatically disabled when authentication is required. Similarly, Postfix provides either NO null encryption cipher-suites, or ONLY null encryption cipher-suites. One is unlikely to stumble into a null-only configuration by accident and not notice. With appropriate documentation, sensible default settings, and configuration interfaces that make good choices easy and bad choices more difficult, one can safely provide support for non-mainstream use-cases. This is not to say that null encryption ciphers for TLS 1.3 are unconditionally good, their specification would need to provide sound security considerations and be fit for purpose. But I do think that we should not reject the proposal out of hand. -- -- Viktor.
- [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Jack Visoky
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Ted Lemon
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Mike Bishop
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Judson Wilson
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Lyndon Nerenberg
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Judson Wilson
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Judson Wilson
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Bill Frantz
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Andreas Walz
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Jack Visoky
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Richard Barnes
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Ted Lemon
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Jack Visoky
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Fries, Steffen
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Fries, Steffen
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Ted Lemon
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Ted Lemon
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Fries, Steffen
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Jack Visoky
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Jack Visoky
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Ted Lemon
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Jack Visoky
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Ted Lemon
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Bill Frantz
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Jack Visoky
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Ted Lemon
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Jack Visoky
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Jack Visoky
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] null auth ciphers for TLS 1.3? Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] null auth ciphers for TLS 1.3? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] null auth ciphers for TLS 1.3? David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] null auth ciphers for TLS 1.3? Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] raw public keys in the wild? Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] raw public keys in the wild? Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] null auth ciphers for TLS 1.3? Wang Haiguang
- Re: [TLS] null auth ciphers for TLS 1.3? Bill Frantz
- Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: integrity only ciphersuit… Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)
- Re: [TLS] integrity only ciphersuites Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)
- Re: [TLS] raw public keys in the wild? Richard Barnes
- Re: [TLS] raw public keys in the wild? Viktor Dukhovni