Re: [TLS] [tls13-spec] relax certificate_list ordering requirements to match current practice (#169)

[Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <[e-mail]>]

On Mon, 2015-05-11 at 11:41 -0700, Ryan Sleevi wrote:

> That's not true. I've explicitly stated it's a BAD requirement, and tried
> to give concrete examples.
> 
> I'll be explicit:
> 
> 1) I think clients, such as Martin's, that implement normative checking of
> ordering and are used for the Internet at large (e.g. between servers and
> clients that are not controlled by a single entity) are bad for Internet
> security.
> 2) I think clients, such as Martin's and Geoff's, that do not implement
> RFC 4158 path discovery are bad for Internet security.

That is of course if you define Internet as the web, and "security" as
the web PKI. What you are in fact describing is a failure of the web PKI
which RFC 4158 makes apparent. When you define trust as "anything my
browser trusts", then indeed you are going to have trust issues once you
switch to a browser from a different vendor. Nevertheless, RFC 4158 is
far from being a standard (just an informational RFC), and there are
standard's track extensions which can address the issue [0] and can
allow the server to decide which path to send. Does your good for
Internet implementation utilize it?

regards,
Nikos

[0]. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-6