[TLS] closing KeyUpdate

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Fri, 09 September 2016 18:07 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 14:07:40 -0400
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Subject: [TLS] closing KeyUpdate
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The discussion about KeyUpdate-related changes has trailed off so it is time to begin to bring the discussion to a close.  It appears that there as if there is support to land https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/61.  But, there’s still some discussion about how to add both P3 and P4 [0].  In the interest of making progress, we're instructing the editor to land PR#61 now.

Keith had argued for a restriction that wouldn't introduce any wire changes: i.e., forbid implementations from sending an update_not_requested KeyUpdate unless it is triggered by an update_requested KeyUpdate.  Ilari has pointed out a limitation with this approach, but the question is: does the WG favor the restriction proposed by Keith? Please let the WG know by next Wednesday (9/14) so that we can come closure on this topic.

Thanks,

J&S

[0] Where Keith suggested:

P3 = A side can learn that P1 has been read by the other side.

P4 = Neither side can cause the other to accrue an unbounded deferred write obligation; in fact the maximum accruable deferred write obligation is one KeyUpdate.