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Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Mon, 05 October 2015 04:12 UTC

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References: <79C632BCF9D17346A0D3285990FDB01AA3B9DAD8@HOBEX21.hob.de> <55FC5822.5070709@trigofacile.com> <77583acbe981488493fd4f0110365dae@ustx2ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com> <55FC7343.3090301@trigofacile.com> <6796F70E-44FD-4CD8-A691-6D0BFAE6EFDC@cs.meiji.ac.jp> <682cb934aeeb42fabdf1fecfccf4c5b5@ustx2ex-dag1mb3.msg.corp.akamai.com> <7E1B8B3D-DEF5-439A-8E56-0CB2DFC061A8@cs.meiji.ac.jp> <ED4C2E8B-3327-451E-8E59-D87705B935C8@gmail.com> <84faf2113b9946f79763886867d65925@ustx2ex-dag1mb3.msg.corp.akamai.com> <CAH8yC8=JcWo+4rtymKLCfs3aKFQmCc+C4jD0eb74jbfMLJFAaw@mail.gmail.com> <CABcZeBOD+jwFDaed6sqfBGabR1kpRjnAvAb5Pm9jCk43=s4Fzg@mail.gmail.com> <CABkgnnX_3VZZLb8HdM=zqLp70dsURM1gPiSZdE9nzDByaMkBzw@mail.gmail.com> <CABcZeBOPd55SFGD13-jUsqLGOMxhEYbcrYcxdOQC2D39cJESGQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 04 Oct 2015 21:11:59 -0700
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed
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On 4 October 2015 at 21:06, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
> Yes, if the attacker can provide their own data, it makes matters worse,
> but as the reference I provided indicated, there are potential security
> issues even if the attacker is not able to do so, provided that the data
> is sufficiently redundant.


Sometimes, it's OK.  Sometimes, not.  Agreed.

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