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Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT

Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com> Thu, 04 May 2017 00:19 UTC

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From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com>
Date: Wed, 03 May 2017 17:19:41 -0700
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To: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
Cc: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT
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On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:16 PM, Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> wrote:

>
> No we don't. Servers can prevent replay.
>

Replay prevention looks straight forward with a server-side cache.  This
may not work well for the top 1,000 web sites, but I bet it will work well
for the bottom 1 billion sites.  Personally I think the important thing is
for popular HTTP server software to implement replay protection for TLS 1.3
0-RTT by default.  Admins at literally millions of small companies are
going to want to enable this new 0-RTT hotness.  That part should be made
easy - say one line in a config.  Enabling 0-RTT without replay protection
should be harder.

Bill

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