Re: [TLS] draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01

Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> Mon, 17 July 2017 12:21 UTC

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From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 07:21:39 -0500
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To: Roland Dobbins <rdobbins@arbor.net>
Cc: Matthew Green <matthewdgreen@gmail.com>, dkg <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01
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On Jul 17, 2017 6:06 AM, "Roland Dobbins" <rdobbins@arbor.net>; wrote:

On 16 Jul 2017, at 0:34, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:

Strongly enough to support a proposal that would require this to be
> opt-in from both sides, with an explicit and verifiable exfiltration
> authority, so that no standard implementation of the proposed mechanism
> could be accidentally turned on unilaterally without detection by the
> unwitting peer?
>

Quite possibly, yes - the devil will be in the details, but the concept is
perfectly valid, IMHO.


I've read or skimmed much of these threads. I support an opt-in mechanism
like the one I think dkg is imagining.

It should be visible on the outside on the connection, so middle boxes that
don't break TLS can see that TLS is being broken. (Is that irony? After
Alanis I'm never sure anymore...)

I don't know enough minutia to have a well considered opinion about what
track such a doc should be, but not-Standards seems good.

-tom