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Re: [TLS] HTTPS Phishing sites

David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Fri, 26 May 2017 05:24 UTC

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From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Sankalp Bagaria <sankalp.nitt@gmail.com>, tls@ietf.org
Cc: Balaji Rajendran <balajirajendran@gmail.com>, sankalp <sankalp@cdac.in>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] HTTPS Phishing sites
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On Fri, 2017-05-26 at 10:46 +0530, Sankalp Bagaria wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/59238/cyber-crime/https-phishing-sites.html claims
> that phishing websites using HTTPS are increasing in number. If malicious sites can
> get certificates, it defeats the purpose of TLS. In my opinion, tougher measures are
> required to prevent malicious sites getting legitimate certificates. What can we do
> about it ?

I wouldn't say that it defeats the purpose of TLS.

If https://hackerssite.co.ua/ has a TLS certificate validating that it
really is hackerssite.co.ua, and I go there for my online banking...
well that's kind of my fault. That domain *isn't* my bank's clearly
owned domain name, and I should be looking for an EV certificate with
my bank's name in it.

So that would be *my* fault.... unless I suppose my bank have ACTIVELY
TRAINED me to succumb to fraud, by doing something insanely
incompetently negligent.... like Nat West running their online banking
on 'nwolb.com', with a certificate that says 'Royal Bank of Scotland'.
Neither of which match the brand "Nat West" by which I know my bank.

Those morons should probably be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the
fraud that they are enabling. Because *their* behaviour defeats the
purpose of TLS.

cf. http://david.woodhou.se/re-registration.html

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