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[TLS] Re: PKI dynamics and trust anchor negotiation

Bas Westerbaan <bas@cloudflare.com> Sat, 08 February 2025 08:12 UTC

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From: Bas Westerbaan <bas@cloudflare.com>
Date: Sat, 08 Feb 2025 09:12:06 +0100
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CC: Mike Shaver <mike.shaver@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: PKI dynamics and trust anchor negotiation
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>
> Silly clarification: the TAI identifier is just a compact identifier
> for the root cert, like (making it up) a 4 byte identifier? So the
> client sends the entire list of root certs supported, so about 100, so
> 400 bytes?
>
> In that case I think you can inject it into an end-entity cert on
> issuance, and into the root representations in the trust store.


Yeah, this is an interesting alternative design. You can reduce the size
quite a bit more with simple compression techniques. See

  https://github.com/davidben/tls-trust-expressions/issues/64
  https://github.com/bwesterb/go-ncrlite



> Where
> this doesn't work out well is on cross signs where the cert can root
> to multiple places/when more than one cert is needed to cover and the
> config only has one, but this would solve a bunch of the issues for
> command line programs where the trust store format is a bag of certs
> on disk. It could also work for cross signs since the intermediates
> used are known by the CA.
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson
>
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