Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 02 May 2019 17:05 UTC

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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 13:04:29 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"
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On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 5:29 PM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

> > On Apr 26, 2019, at 11:24 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> >
> > If they haven’t already moved off TLS 1 then maybe this document will
> give the right people a push to do so.
> >
> > Nobody is going to arrest an MTA for non compliance.
>
> Of course.
>
> And as I said, I'd like to see the document move forward, I just
> wanted to see whether there was any appetite for adding some
> operator guidance.  It's not an issue of internet policing,
> rather it is a question of whether there should advice for
> operators who are considering disabling the legacy protocols.
>
> The sound-bite version is: first raise the ceiling, *then* the floor.
>
> The advice would therefore be for everyone to first make sure that
> their systems support at least TLS 1.2, and not just the now deprecated
> versions.  And then check whether the same holds true for their application
> ecosystem and if so disable the protocols at that time.
>
> In unauthenticated opportunistic TLS where cleartext is used when TLS
> handshakes fail, removing support for TLS 1.0 can reduce security in the
> short term (some messages needlessly going in cleartext).  Yes, this may
> be what it takes to finally get the long tail procrastinators to upgrade.
>
> The operational question then boils down to timing: when is your
> application
> ecosystem ready to drop the training wheels.
>
> Anyway, it does not look like there's much interest in adding operational
> considerations, which users will then perhaps learn about elsewhere if
> need be.  That's fine...
>

Thanks for your follow up assessment on this from the WG.  It seems we are
in agreement.

I appreciate your review, consideration, and attention to deployment
statistics for this move.

Best regards,
Kathleen

>
> --
>         Viktor.
>
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-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen