[TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entries
S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com> Fri, 28 February 2025 19:30 UTC
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Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2025 11:28:46 -0800
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, tls@ietf.org
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entries
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Hi Ilari, At 12:18 AM 28-02-2025, Ilari Liusvaara wrote: >What kind of private keys? Is that just the known trouble (TLS_RSA_*, >TLS_PSK_* and the session ticket extension), or is it also other key >types? Of those, only the pure-PSK stuff remains in TLS 1.3 (TLS 1.3 >does have session tickets, but the mechanism is not a security >disaster). Thank you for asking those questions. I don't have any information about the key types. >Those three are especially suited for large-scale monitoring, because >all destroy any forward secrecy, avoiding attacker having to steal >keys on per-connection basis. Which is certainly highly convinient >for attacker. > >I don't think putting non-ephemeral keys into SSLKEYLOGFILE would >be even remotely reasonable. One of the advantages, in my opinion, of having an open discussion could be to figure out all that. Regards, S. Moonesamy
- [TLS] Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entries Sipos, Brian J.
- [TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entri… Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entri… S Moonesamy
- [TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entri… Eric Rescorla
- [TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entri… Ilari Liusvaara
- [TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entri… John Mattsson
- [TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entri… John Mattsson
- [TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entri… Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entri… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entri… S Moonesamy
- [TLS] Re: Additional uses for SSLKEYLOGFILE entri… Yaroslav Rosomakho