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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Ryan Hamilton <rch@google.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] RFC 7919 on Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
 Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Thread-Index: AQHR+kiDZXbZlYKpgUOnaUdD5zLR56BP1VcAgA0Cxf7//0i6gIACLpuB
Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2016 11:48:52 +0000
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Cc: Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] RFC 7919 on Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
 Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
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Ryan Hamilton <rch@google.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Alternatively, someone could write a "Legacy TLS" to "Current TLS" proxy,=
=0A=
>which could run on the client's computer to sit in front of these legacy=
=0A=
>devices. This would allow browsers to continue adding new security feature=
s=0A=
>to protect users, while still allowing access to legacy systems.?=0A=
=0A=
Yep, that'd be the other way of doing the "embedded device management=0A=
solution".  Mind you I think these already exist, they're just called=0A=
antivirus proxies and security scanners [0].=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=
=0A=
[0] Referring to the number of these that ignore cert checking, allow weak=
=0A=
    keys and ciphers, and so on.=0A=
=0A=

