Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP
Schmidt, Jörn-Marc <Joern-Marc.Schmidt@secunet.com> Mon, 20 July 2015 11:59 UTC
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From: "Schmidt, Jörn-Marc" <Joern-Marc.Schmidt@secunet.com>
To: Geoff Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP
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Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 11:58:55 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP
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>> TLS-pwd already supports both of these. It also supports ECC too, >> which is problematic with the current SRP protocol. >In the language of the CFRG draft, TLS-pwd is “balanced” where SRP is “augmented”, >so they’re not really equivalent, correct? Correct. >This is possible, but you’d need to have the client and server negotiate based on >what they have. For example, if the server has a SRP verifier from the current >protocol, but the client has a stored PBKDF2 hash of the password for that server, >they cannot communicate and would need to pick a different cipher suite. I am not >sure how you can do this without revealing the existence of an account under some >circumstances. So this might be a situation where fewer protocol options is better. Of course both sides have to agree on common protocol details: You could do this by specifying that you want to use PAKE and refine in an extension a set of schemes that you are capable of. I think there are many flavors out there that may be beneficial in specific use-cases. I envision that e.g. in the context of the IoT with very constrained devices (specific) PAKE schemes might be helpful. Having an ExtensionType & corresponding CipherSuites for each of them would be way too much. Best, Jörn
- [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Attila Molnar
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Attila Molnar
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Tom Wu
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Schmidt
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Geoff Keating
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Schmidt
- Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP Jeffrey Walton