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Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates

Mounira Msahli <mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr> Mon, 27 August 2018 17:31 UTC

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Date: Mon, 27 Aug 2018 19:31:15 +0200
From: Mounira Msahli <mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Cc: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, tls <tls@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates
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Why does the first point matter? And the certificates are embedded pretty opaquely in TLS. 

I think, I answered your question in my last mail?

Kind Regards 
Mounira  

----- Mail original -----
De: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
À: "Mounira Msahli" <mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr>
Cc: "Hubert Kario" <hkario@redhat.com>, "tls" <tls@ietf.org>
Envoyé: Lundi 27 Août 2018 18:37:50
Objet: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates



On Mon, Aug 27, 2018, 8:21 AM Mounira Msahli < [ mailto:mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr | mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr ] > wrote: 


Hi Hubert, 

I can do the exercise but the result will be two sections totally decorrelated: one for TLS 1.3 and one for TLS 1.2. Two drafts in one document. 

- The handshake phase in TLS 1.2 is different from handshake/TLS1.3 
- The certificate type is different. One uses cert_type and the other uses extension defined in [RFC7250]. 




Why does the first point matter? And the certificates are embedded pretty opaquely in TLS. 


BQ_BEGIN


Kind Regards 
Mounira 



----- Mail original ----- 
De: "Hubert Kario" < [ mailto:hkario@redhat.com | hkario@redhat.com ] > 
À: "tls" < [ mailto:tls@ietf.org | tls@ietf.org ] > 
Cc: "Mounira Msahli" < [ mailto:mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr | mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr ] >, "Ilari Liusvaara" < [ mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com | ilariliusvaara@welho.com ] > 
Envoyé: Lundi 27 Août 2018 16:39:56 
Objet: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates 

On Friday, 24 August 2018 19:44:36 CEST Mounira Msahli wrote: 
> - You should also specify use in TLS 1.2 in the same draft (or say that 
> is prohibited). This is so one only needs one reference for the 
> codepoint allocation. 
> 
> >>> It is not prohibited, for TLS 1.2 the extension is already specified: [ 
> >>> [ https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-01 | https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-01 ] ] 
> [ [ https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-01 | https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-01 ] | 
> [ https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-01 | https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-01 ] ] We will 
> update the draft 

wouldn't then it be better to combine them and have one standard (document) 
that describes use in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3? I may be missing something but I 
don't see anything that would prevent use of the same codepoints in both 
protocol versions 

-- 
Regards, 
Hubert Kario 
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team 
Web: [ http://www.cz.redhat.com/ | www.cz.redhat.com ] 
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech Republic 

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BQ_END

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