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Re: [TLS] Using RSA PSS in TLS

Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> Thu, 15 January 2015 00:31 UTC

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Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 01:31:49 +0100
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Using RSA PSS in TLS
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On Wed, 14 Jan 2015 15:32:42 +0100
CodesInChaos <codesinchaos@gmail.com> wrote:

> I consider the risk of PKCS#1v1.5 encryption far bigger than the risk
> of PKCS#1v1.5 signatures.
> I'm not aware of any attack against  PKCS#1v1.5 signatures, they
> merely lack a security proof.

Bleichenbacher's signature forgery attack [1], which has recently been
re-discovered in combination with some ASN.1 issues under the name
BERserk [2].

Sure, these are "mere implementation issues". You can do PKCS #1 1.5
signatures right - just like you can do PKCS #1 1.5 encryption right.
It's just that people did it wrong multiple times. I don't see simliar
risks with PSS, it's the much more robust solution.


[1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/msg00999.html
[2] http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/
-- 
Hanno Böck
http://hboeck.de/

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