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Re: [TLS] Require deterministic ECDSA

Jacob Maskiewicz <jmaskiew@eng.ucsd.edu> Sat, 23 January 2016 19:27 UTC

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Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2016 11:27:36 -0800
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From: Jacob Maskiewicz <jmaskiew@eng.ucsd.edu>
To: Joseph Birr-Pixton <jpixton@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Require deterministic ECDSA
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The main argument I see from the RFC for deterministic ECDSA is computing k
on systems without high quality entropy sources. But any system running a
TLS stack is already going to have a high quality entropy source for
client/server randoms and IVs and such, so what's the benefit of
deterministic ECDSA here?

-Jake M
On Jan 23, 2016 11:13 AM, "Joseph Birr-Pixton" <jpixton@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I'd like to propose that TLS1.3 mandates RFC6979 deterministic ECDSA.
>
> For discussion, here's a pull request with possible language:
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/406
>
> Cheers,
> Joe
>
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> TLS@ietf.org
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