[TLS] Updated EdDSA in TLS drafts

Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> Mon, 08 June 2015 09:52 UTC

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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
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Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 11:52:23 +0200
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Subject: [TLS] Updated EdDSA in TLS drafts
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Hello.

I've updated my EdDSA-in-TLS draft to clarify the choice of
HashAlgorithm that goes together with the EdDSA SignatureAlgorithm,
please see:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-tls-eddsa-01

The other feedback I have received is to reuse the existing ECDSA
ciphersuites.  I think this is a good idea, and believe it would likely
work, but it is a fundamentally different approach.  I created another
draft to describe that approach, now published as:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-tls-eddsa2-00

Having these two approaches described separately allows us to review
both and decide which is the better approach.

More feedback is appreciated!  Some issues that is not clear to me
includes:

* Is it a good idea to reuse the NamedCurve value for Curve25519 for
  Ed25519 too?

* Similar question for ECPointFormat.  Maybe EdDSA should use a
  different definition here.

For more context, related to the above is a draft describing OIDs for
EdDSA for use in PKIX certificates as public keys and a signature
algorithm:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-pkix-eddsa-00

Cheers,
/Simon