[TLS] Updated EdDSA in TLS drafts

Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> Mon, 08 June 2015 09:52 UTC

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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
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Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 11:52:23 +0200
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Subject: [TLS] Updated EdDSA in TLS drafts
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I've updated my EdDSA-in-TLS draft to clarify the choice of
HashAlgorithm that goes together with the EdDSA SignatureAlgorithm,
please see:


The other feedback I have received is to reuse the existing ECDSA
ciphersuites.  I think this is a good idea, and believe it would likely
work, but it is a fundamentally different approach.  I created another
draft to describe that approach, now published as:


Having these two approaches described separately allows us to review
both and decide which is the better approach.

More feedback is appreciated!  Some issues that is not clear to me

* Is it a good idea to reuse the NamedCurve value for Curve25519 for
  Ed25519 too?

* Similar question for ECPointFormat.  Maybe EdDSA should use a
  different definition here.

For more context, related to the above is a draft describing OIDs for
EdDSA for use in PKIX certificates as public keys and a signature