Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Tue, 27 October 2020 01:12 UTC
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Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 18:12:23 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 06:07:07PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote: > On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 6:00 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote: > > > On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 05:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 7:13 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote: > > > > > > > Hi Ekr, > > > > > > > > Thanks for chiming in. > > > > > > > > On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 08:59:43AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > > > > > > > > - I agree with Ben that the current construction has some awkward > > > > > properties and that prefixing the length field would remedy that. > > It's > > > > > been quite some time since we had this discussion but as I recall the > > > > > rationale was to protect the bits on the wire as-is rather than some > > > > > reconstructed version of them (see a number of long discussions on > > > > > this topic), so just prefixing the CID length is also not ideal. > > > > > > > > I think the current scheme is unfortunately using fields put together > > in a > > > > rather different order than the actual bits on the wire (more below). > > > > > > > > > > Right. I forgot that we also preserved the TLS order of the seqnum. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This is a little goofy but it has (I think) the properties that (1) > > the > > > > > bytes appear > > > > > in the MAC in the order they appear on the wire (2) fixed-length > > metadata > > > > > appears in > > > > > the front (the seq_num already does) (3) the duplicated tls12_cid in > > the > > > > > front avoids confusion with MAC input for other records. > > > > > > > > I like (1) and (2) and agree with (3), though I'm having a little > > trouble > > > > lining up your figure with the DTLSCiphertext structure, which I'll > > repeat > > > > here so I'm not flipping back and forth as much: > > > > > > > > struct { > > > > ContentType special_type = tls12_cid; > > > > ProtocolVersion version; > > > > uint16 epoch; > > > > uint48 sequence_number; > > > > opaque cid[cid_length]; // New field > > > > uint16 length; > > > > opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length]; > > > > } DTLSCiphertext; > > > > > > > > Ah, your proposal looks more natural if I compare it to the current > > AEAD > > > > "additional_data" from the -07: > > > > > > > > # additional_data = seq_num + > > > > # tls12_cid + > > > > # DTLSCipherText.version + > > > > # cid + > > > > # cid_length + > > > > # length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext; > > > > > > > > If I could try to synthesize your key points (as I understand them), > > hewing > > > > more strictly to the "bits on the wire" philosophy would suggest > > having us > > > > use: > > > > > > > > additional_data: > > > > struct { > > > > uint8 marker = tls12_cid; > > > > uint8 cid_len; > > > > uint8 content_type = tls12_cid; \ > > > > uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version; | appears on wire > > > > uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch | > > > > opaque cid[cid_len]; / > > > > uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext; > > > > }; > > > > > > > > > > > Mostly. > > > > > > I would expect the length here to not be DTLSInnerPlaintext but rather > > the > > > length field that appears on the wire, as in TLS 1.3. Do you agree with > > > that? If not, let's discuss. If so, we can talk about the others. > > > > Good catch, the length on the wire makes more sense. (I presume I just > > cribbed from the -07 here and didn't think hard enough. > > > > So I think that the following is right for MtE. > > struct { > uint8 marker = tls12_cid; > uint8 cid_len; > uint8 content_type = tls12_cid; \ > uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version; | appears on wire > uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch | > opaque cid[cid_len]; / > uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext; > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content; \ > DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type; | entirety of DTLSInnerPlaintext > DTLSInnerPlaintext.zeros; / > }; Sounds good. > > As for EtM > > Encrypt-then-MAC: > struct { > uint8 marker = tls12_cid; > uint8 cid_len; > uint8 content_type = tls12_cid; \ > uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version; | appears on wire > uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch | > opaque cid[cid_len]; / > uint16 iv_length; > opaque IV[iv_length]; > uint16 enc_content_length; > opaque enc_content[enc_content_length]; > }; > > This seems kind of unfortunate in that the 7366 version is much more > faithful to the wire, so I still have to think about this one some more, I > think... Yeah, I was not super happy with that one as I wrote it (hence my comment about it), but I also wasn't around when 7366 was being written, so I don't have much else to draw on. -Ben
- [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connec… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connec… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connec… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connec… Achim Kraus
- [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-c… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connec… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connec… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… antoine
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… antoine
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dt… Eric Rescorla