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Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0

Xiaoyong Wu <X.Wu@F5.com> Tue, 21 May 2013 17:16 UTC

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From: Xiaoyong Wu <X.Wu@F5.com>
To: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0
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Date: Tue, 21 May 2013 17:16:20 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0
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> True. Though the spec for DTLS does allow DTLS implementations to
> terminate a connection in the event of errors.
>
> It's just that most (all?) implementations don't.
>
>From a practical point of view, terminating on MAC error is prone to a simple attack, especially on IPv4 network. An attacker would only need to forge a UDP packet to either the client/server to get the connection terminated.


-Xiaoyong

> -----Original Message-----
> From: tls-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Paterson, Kenny
> Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2013 7:01 AM
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0
> 
> Hi
> 
> On 21 May 2013, at 14:47, Martin Rex wrote:
> 
> > The alleged (confidentiality) problems that have been demonstrated so
> > far are about design-flawed communication peers that require an
> > attacker to be able to insert data into the beginning of the
> > TLS-protected communication an repeat the request a few thousand times
> > (or more) in order to perform plaintext recovery on allegedley
> > confidential data that the attacked communication peer willingly
> > inserted into the same TLS channel following the data provided by the
> attacker.
> 
> This is an incorrect representation of the known attacks on confidentiality (as
> I understand them, at least).
> 
> - The attacker-injected data does not have to be at the start of the TLS-
> protected communication.
> - The peer-inserted data does not have to follow the attacker-provided data.
> 
> > Datagram TLS (DTLS) is another can of worms, because it has an
> > unreasonable requirement to ignore unlimited amounts of MAC-failing
> > DTLS records on a DTLS connection, but that is a defect from which the
> > stream-oriented regular TLS protocols do not suffer.
> 
> True. Though the spec for DTLS does allow DTLS implementations to
> terminate a connection in the event of errors.
> 
> It's just that most (all?) implementations don't.
> 
> Cheers!
> 
> Kenny
> 
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