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Re: [TLS] An IETF draft on TLS based on ECCSI public key (RFC 6507)

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Sun, 09 July 2017 23:49 UTC

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 09:48:57 +1000
Message-ID: <CABkgnnXf1NWAPBAHgGYsaKfvRQnusnpOr=PwjmeDNZAyTJR+tQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] An IETF draft on TLS based on ECCSI public key (RFC 6507)
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On 8 July 2017 at 05:40, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> The TLS WG wants to work on a a way to combine a PSK with (EC)DH after the
> current specification is finished for quantum protection.

TLS 1.3 allows this already.  The drawback being that you need to get
the PSK.  At the moment, this means talking to the server once before
in most cases.  I thought that the PQ plan was to add a new key
exchange paired with ECDH, along the lines of what was proposed in
draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-01  (I recall someone asking CFRG for advice on
combining of the outputs, but that doesn't seem to have gone
anywhere).

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