[TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-05.txt

internet-drafts@ietf.org Mon, 07 July 2025 19:28 UTC

MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Message-ID: <175191653336.1915521.10407698545595344695@dt-datatracker-6fcb845cd4-p6tkq>
Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2025 12:28:53 -0700
Message-ID-Hash: Y2BK54JX45UIYTJBPWX57KJ76DI5O74Y
CC: tls@ietf.org
Reply-To: tls@ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-05.txt
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/yMr5isKNpPQ1wfREypMSv_lAVvw>

Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-05.txt is now available. It
is a work item of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) WG of the IETF.

   Title:   Extended Key Update for Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3
   Authors: Hannes Tschofenig
            Michael Tüxen
            Tirumaleswar Reddy
            Steffen Fries
            Yaroslav Rosomakho
   Name:    draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-05.txt
   Pages:   18
   Dates:   2025-07-07

Abstract:

   TLS 1.3 ensures forward secrecy by performing an ephemeral Diffie-
   Hellman key exchange during the initial handshake, protecting past
   communications even if a party's long-term keys are later
   compromised.  While the built-in KeyUpdate mechanism allows traffic
   keys to be refreshed during a session, it does not introduce new
   forward-secret key material.  This limitation can pose a security
   risk in long-lived sessions, such as those found in industrial IoT or
   telecommunications environments.

   To address this, this specification defines an extended key update
   mechanism that performs a fresh Diffie-Hellman exchange within an
   active session, thereby re-establishing forward secrecy beyond the
   initial handshake.  By forcing attackers to exfiltrate new key
   material repeatedly, this approach mitigates the risks associated
   with static key compromise.  Regular renewal of session keys helps
   contain the impact of such compromises.  The extension is applicable
   to both TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3.

The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update/

There is also an HTMLized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-05

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-05

Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at:
rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts

[TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-upd… internet-drafts