Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-02.txt
Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Wed, 22 March 2017 21:50 UTC
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-02.txt
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> On Mar 22, 2017, at 10:56 AM, Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net> wrote: > > The draft could definitely benefit from > additional review. I find it ironic that section 4 includes: The components of the authentication chain are built by starting at the target record set and its corresponding RRSIG. Then traversing the DNS tree upwards towards the trust anchor zone (normally the DNS root), for each zone cut, the DNSKEY and DS RRsets and their signatures are added. If DNS responses messages contain any domain names utilizing name compression [RFC1035], then they must be uncompressed. while at the same time there is ongoing discussion of *adding* compression of the server certificate chain (as a TLS 1.3 extension). Would the compression of server certificates also cover compression of the DNSSEC chain extension? If so, perhaps this would be a belated moral victory for DJB[1]. :-) -- -- Viktor. [1] https://cr.yp.to/djbdns/notes.html Compression Compression DNS packets use an ad-hoc compression method in which portions of domain names can sometimes be replaced with two-byte pointers to previous domain names. The precise rule is that a name can be compressed if it is a response owner name, the name in NS data, the name in CNAME data, the name in PTR data, the name in MX data, or one of the names in SOA data. One problem with DNS compression is the amount of code required to parse it. Reliably locating all these names takes quite a bit of work that would otherwise have been unnecessary for a DNS cache. LZ77 compression would have been much easier to implement. Another problem with DNS compression is the amount of code required to correctly generate it. (RFC 1035 allowed servers to not bother compressing their responses; however, caches have to implement compression, so that address lists from some well-known sites don't burst the seams of a DNS UDP packet.) Not only does the compressor need to figure out which names can be compressed, but it also needs to keep track of compression targets earlier in the packet. RFC 1035 doesn't make clear exactly what targets are allowed. (Most versions of BIND do not use pointers except to compressible names; suffixes of the query name are excluded. dnscache uses pointers to suffixes of the query name.) Another problem with DNS compression is that it's not particularly effective. LZ77 would have done a noticeably better job on current data, and a much better job on new record types that might become popular in the future. (BIND versions 4.9.* through 8.1.2 compress names in new record types, such as RP and SRV, in blatant violation of RFC 1035. The names are not decompressed by caches that do not know about the new types. This is an interoperability disaster.)
- [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-cha… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Melinda Shore
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Sean Turner
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Melinda Shore
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Melinda Shore
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Melinda Shore
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Sean Turner
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Shumon Huque
- Re: [TLS] A few comments on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec… Shumon Huque