Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5246 (6572)

Given that RFC 5246 is obsolete, all of this is largely moot.

I think that we can reject this erratum.

On Thu, May 6, 2021, at 09:06, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> I agree that this isn't an appropriate change for an erratum.
> 
> Even with a new RFC updating RFC 5246, we'd still need to have some
> discussion about a transition plan, at which point just relying
> on the guidance in BCP 195 becomes more and more attractive.
> 
> -Ben
> 
> On Wed, May 05, 2021 at 04:00:00PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > I'm not sure precisely what attacks you are referring to here. In
> > particular, I'm not aware of any known security issues with HMAC-SHA1. With
> > that said, I agree that we wouldn't choose AES_128_CBC_SHA as a default
> > now, but this isn't usually the kind of thing we would usually use an
> > erratum for. Rather, this would be appropriate for a new RFC updating 5246.
> > 
> > -Ekr
> > 
> > 
> > On Wed, May 5, 2021 at 3:21 AM RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
> > wrote:
> > 
> > > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5246,
> > > "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2".
> > >
> > > --------------------------------------
> > > You may review the report below and at:
> > > https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6572__;!!GjvTz_vk!FfdA-HJa47sbeeDEDwh3TNDNxVmLXLJdZQ-bzn4yM_KdLFt6kEcEiWduzMMlqw$ 
> > >
> > > --------------------------------------
> > > Type: Technical
> > > Reported by: Johannes Görlich <johannes.goerlich@siemens.com>
> > >
> > > Section: 9
> > >
> > > Original Text
> > > -------------
> > > In the absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise, a
> > > TLS-compliant application MUST implement the cipher suite
> > > TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (see Appendix A.5 for the definition).
> > >
> > > Corrected Text
> > > --------------
> > > In the absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise, a
> > > TLS-compliant application MUST implement the cipher suite
> > > TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (see Appendix A.5 for the definition).
> > >
> > > Notes
> > > -----
> > > A must-be-implement cipher suite should not relay on a bulk encryption
> > > algorithm which is vulnerable to plain-text attacks or on a secure hash
> > > algorithm which has been proven to be insecure.
> > >
> > > Instructions:
> > > -------------
> > > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> > > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> > > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
> > > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
> > >
> > > --------------------------------------
> > > RFC5246 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10)
> > > --------------------------------------
> > > Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version
> > > 1.2
> > > Publication Date    : August 2008
> > > Author(s)           : T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
> > > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> > > Source              : Transport Layer Security
> > > Area                : Security
> > > Stream              : IETF
> > > Verifying Party     : IESG
> > >
> 
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