Re: [TLS] draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Sat, 08 July 2017 12:36 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 15:36:26 +0300
In-Reply-To: <kokbii6v34dsk060vpa2if7u.1499483924916@emailplus.mobileiron.com>
Cc: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
To: Timothy Jackson <tjackson@mobileiron.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01
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> On 8 Jul 2017, at 6:18, Timothy Jackson <tjackson@mobileiron.com>; wrote:
> 
> As an earlier poster asked, what advantage does this approach have over TLS-inspecting proxies? Every IPS/IDS/next gen firewall with which I am familiar is able to terminate at TLS connection, inspect/copy/filter, and then encrypt on a new TLS sessions.
> 
> For high performance customers, the SSL accelerators can be sandwiched around the filter so all the crypto is done in hardware.
> 
> The ways to prevent TLS inspection are cert pinning and client cert auth. If this is only within one's data center, then those features can be disabled if necessary, no?
> 
> What use case am I missing that can't be achieved better by other means than static keys?

They would like to store traffic captures encrypted and be able to decrypt them a little later if that is necessary. Storing plaintext is something that auditors (rightfully!) don’t like.

They also don’t want to install TLS proxies all over the place.  That’s a large extra expense for them.

Yoav