Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI
Nelson B Bolyard <nelson@bolyard.com> Fri, 14 September 2007 21:11 UTC
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Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2007 14:10:58 -0700
From: Nelson B Bolyard <nelson@bolyard.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI
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Cc: Chris Newman <Chris.Newman@Sun.COM>, "Yee, Peter" <pyee@rsasecurity.com>
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Chris Newman wrote: > As far as I can tell, the real-world MTI for SSL/TLS as deployed is > RC4. I dislike it when the real world MTI and the specified MTI differ > and the specification fails to explain the difference. I think the RFC does not need a Mandatory Cipher Suite. There are different marketplaces for TLS, and each one will define its own mandatory cipher suite. I see no need to say that all implementations must do one. Each implementation is intended to operate in one or more marketplaces, and market forces will ensure that all implementations in each market will implement the cipher suite that is the de facto standard mandatory one. TLS 1.0 defined TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA and the eCommerce marketplace utterly ignored that. Several implementations STILL do not implement that cipher suite to this day, yet that has not resulted in a lack of interoperability. Interoperability for eCommerce has employed the RSA+RC4 cipher suites, as Chris noted. > It's my belief that AES-CBC is more likely to result in future alignment > of the real-world MTI and the specified MTI than 3DES and thus I support > a change from 3DES to AES as MTI. I would also support a change from > 3DES to RC4 as MTI despite some concerns about the cryptographic > longevity of that cipher. Going forward, it's clear that in some markets, AES will be mandated to the exclusion of all else, but in others RC4 will still dominate. I suggest that the RFC should call for the development of profiles of TLS, selected subsets of cipher suites, hello extensions, and perhaps EC curves that will form the basis for interoperability for implementations within the marketplace of each profile. /Nelson _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
- [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Eric Rescorla
- RE: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Mike
- [TLS] Re: Issue 56: AES as MTI Simon Josefsson
- Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Chris Newman
- Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Mike
- Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Chris Newman
- Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] Issue 56: AES as MTI Nicolas Williams