Re: [TLS] Are the AEAD cipher suites a security trade-off win with TLS1.2?

mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Fri, 18 March 2016 17:10 UTC

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To: Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako <anzalaya@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2016 18:10:49 +0100 (CET)
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Are the AEAD cipher suites a security trade-off win with TLS1.2?
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Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako wrote:
>
> IMO, the layer creating the plaintext shouldn't have to pad it for security
> that's the job of the TLS layer.

Yep.  And retrofitting random padding into TLS (all protocol versions, all
PDUs) could be actually pretty simple and straightforward.

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg11626.html

-Martin