[TLS] OT: WPA2-PSK vs. TLS-PSK (was about the PWD Proposal)

[Martin Rex <[e-mail]>]

Off-topic:

Dan Harkins wrote:
> 
>   Below it's noted that if one has access to database of 10,000 salted
> passwords and a dictionary of 100,000 of the most popular passwords
> (assume that quite a few of them will be in the 10,000) that it's
> possible to do a dictionary attack quite easily. Adding PBKDF2 would
> slow that down but not much:
> 
>    http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/01/11/amazon_cloud_wifi_cracking/
> 
>   It's futile to throw more iterations at this problem. The solution is
> using a protocol based on a zero knowledge proof-- like the protocol in
> question-- an get away from broken things like Wifi-Protected Access,
> or any of the TLS-PSK ciphersuites, using passwords. If an adversary gets
> access to a database of passwords then the contents of that database
> should be assumed to be compromised even if they're salted and even if
> they've been PBKDF2'd with 10,000 iterations.


WPA2-PSK is quite different from TLS-PSK in that one should *NOT*
use a memorizable password for WPA2-PSK, but instead a very long and
garbled one that is saved and automatically used.

If you're using WPA2-PSK with an short or memorizable passwort,
then you're not using the technology in the fashion that it is
intended to be used.

What WPA2-PSK does not provide (and where it differs from WPA2-Enterprise)
is confidentiality from other rightful WPA2-PSK clients.  AFAIK, only
for WPA2-Enterprise every communication link will use a seperate
set of keys, while WPA2-PSK clients will all use the same keys
(and therefore can watch each others traffic).

-Martin