Re: [TLS] RFC8446 Fig3

Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com> Fri, 03 May 2019 01:06 UTC

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From: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 21:05:54 -0400
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To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
Cc: tls <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] RFC8446 Fig3
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thanks, I just submitted the erratum.
Yours,
Daniel

On Thu, May 2, 2019 at 8:48 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:

> That's right.  You might open an editorial erratum, which I would suggest
> be held for document update.
>
> Note that there is no promise that the list of extensions is complete, as
> this doesn't show the supported_versions or signature_schemes extension
> either, but the omission is probably not great in this case, since the PSK
> modes  are highly relevant.
>
> On Fri, May 3, 2019, at 10:30, Daniel Migault wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > This might have already been mentioned on the list, but unless I
> > misinterpreter something it seems to me that the second handshake of
> > figure 3 is missing psk_key_exchange_modes extension.
> >
> > Yours,
> > Daniel
> >
> >  Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first handshake
> >  establishes a PSK and the second handshake uses it:
> >  Client Server
> >  Initial Handshake:
> >  ClientHello
> >  + key_share -------->
> >  ServerHello
> >  + key_share
> >  {EncryptedExtensions}
> >  {CertificateRequest*}
> >  {Certificate*}
> >  {CertificateVerify*}
> >  {Finished}
> >  <-------- [Application Data*]
> >  {Certificate*}
> >  {CertificateVerify*}
> >  {Finished} -------->
> >  <-------- [NewSessionTicket]
> >  [Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
> >  Subsequent Handshake:
> >  ClientHello
> >  + key_share*
> >  + pre_shared_key -------->
> >  ServerHello
> >  + pre_shared_key
> >  + key_share*
> >  {EncryptedExtensions}
> >  {Finished}
> >  <-------- [Application Data*]
> >  {Finished} -------->
> >  [Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
> >  Figure 3: Message Flow for Resumption and PSK
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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