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Re: [TLS] Encrypted SNI

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Sun, 06 December 2015 03:31 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 05 Dec 2015 19:31:06 -0800
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To: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Encrypted SNI
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On Sat, Dec 5, 2015 at 7:06 PM, Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> wrote:

> On 5 December 2015 at 12:32, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> > Subject: SNI Encryption Part XLVIII
>
> A small concern that probably is "No, that can't happen", but I would
> want to be sure that a normal (non-encrypted SNI) ClientHello would be
> unable to be wrapped in a new ClientHello to a gateway by a MITM
> (without being detected.)
>

That would certainly be consistent with the proposed design. Why is that
bad?


Also, I'm a little confused about what the client is supposed to put
> in the outer SNI (for the gateway). Is this blank? Some constant?


Whatever SNI you would use to talk to the gateway ordinarily. Otherwise
you would have a distinguisher.



> Does
> this change at all in the simple deployment situation when there is no
> gateway involved, and everything sits on the same server?
>

No.

-Ekr

>
>

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