Re: [TLS] Additional TLS 1.3 results from Chrome

Tanja Lange <tanja@hyperelliptic.org> Mon, 18 December 2017 23:14 UTC

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Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2017 00:08:06 +0100
From: Tanja Lange <tanja@hyperelliptic.org>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Additional TLS 1.3 results from Chrome
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Dear David, dear all,
> These printers use the RSA BSAFE library to implement TLS and this
> library implements the extended_random extension and assigns it number
> 40. This collides with the key_share extension and causes 1.3-capable
> handshakes to fail.
> 
[..]
> 
> (Lastly, we note that in the paper "On the Practical Exploitability of
> Dual EC in TLS Implementations", the authors remarked that they had no
> evidence that a version of BSAFE with extended_random support ever
> shipped. TLS 1.3 appears to have tripped over it.)
> 
Wow, thanks for finding this, it was really baffling us.

All the best
	Tanja