Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices
Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> Fri, 21 March 2014 15:00 UTC
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Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2014 15:59:45 +0100
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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To: "t.petch" <ietfc@btconnect.com>, Michael Sweet <msweet@apple.com>, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices
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On 2014-03-21 15:44, t.petch wrote: > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Michael Sweet" <msweet@apple.com> > To: "Rene Struik" <rstruik.ext@gmail.com> > Cc: <tls@ietf.org> > Sent: Friday, March 21, 2014 12:26 PM > > Rene, > > Installing device certificates during manufacturing is not a simple > process - the factory would need to act as a CA or would need to have a > supply of certificates that matches whatever identifiers are used by the > devices. Not to mention how you'd manage revocation if the root was > compromised... > > <tp> > > Michael > > In the context of syslog security, some years ago now, the question of > device certificates arose and it was said there that they were quite > common. They would be self-signed, which gives much of the needed > security, while avoiding issues of CA and root compromise. In that case the identity would effectively be reduced to a fingerprint (like an SSH key) which could be printed on the outside of the device to facilitate password-free enrollment. This scheme is though not universally applicable because there's a lot of devices where you actually want to know the brand as well including for example the FIDO/Google U2F token so for most devices I suspect you will end-up with a CA anyway. Anders > > Tom Petch > > On Mar 20, 2014, at 9:52 PM, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Hi Robert: >> >> Wouldn't it be much easier to embed device certificates with > constrained devices at manufacturing? This may do away with need > to store info that is not public on servers. >> >> If you could provide some links to discussions in "IoT community > groups" interested in this, that would help. >> >> Best regards, Rene >> >> == >> There is a lot of interest in the IoT community in using some form of > PAKE in conjunction with DTLS (or TLS with EAP) for authenticating > commissioning/bootstrapping of IoT devices onto IoT networks >> >> On 3/20/2014 1:21 PM, Robert Cragie wrote: >>> It should be remembered that TLS is used in places other than web > browsers - the existence of the DICE WG is testament to this. There is a > lot of interest in the IoT community in using some form of PAKE in > conjunction with DTLS (or TLS with EAP) for authenticating > commissioning/bootstrapping of IoT devices onto IoT networks. I realise > this is different to the original proposition in this thread but wanted > to draw this to the attention of the WG nevertheless. >>> >>> Robert >>> >>> On 20 Mar 2014 12:28, "Daniel Kahn Gillmor" <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> > wrote: >>> On 03/20/2014 12:18 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote: >>>> As an important note, you did not define "we" above. A few possible > expansions would be: >>>> >>>> - The TLS WG, where this thread currently lives, does not get to > define Web UI without a charter change. >>>> >>>> - The HTTPbis WG has not asked the TLS WG to take over this work, > nor has it embraced anything like it. >>>> >>>> - The IETF doesn't do this kind of work as a whole body. >>>> >>>> - The IAB (of which none of us are part of the "we") might take the > topic on and suggest ways which the IETF might do the work. >>> >>> yep, thanks for the clarification. I actually meant "we" in the > broad >>> sense of "the community of people who care about making > communications >>> on the web more secure", which includes groups you didn't even > mention >>> above, like web site designers, systems administrators, etc. >>> >>> It's still on-topic here (despite the broad scope implied above) > because >>> the TLS WG does have a role to play, by considering the merits of >>> proposals like http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-tls-care, as >>> well as considering alternatives that deal with this particular use > case. >>> >>>>> option (A) is seriously hard, maybe impossible given the state of > the >>>>> web. option (B) is terrible. >>>> >>>> Exactly right, for any value of "we". >>> >>> :( >>> >>> --dkg >>> >>>> -- >> email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik >> cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363 > > _________________________________________________________ > Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
- [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by def… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Peter Sylvester
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Robert Cragie
- [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (was: … Rene Struik
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (w… Michael Sweet
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (w… t.petch
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (w… Michael Sweet
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (w… Max Pritikin (pritikin)
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (w… Don Sturek
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Robert Cragie
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Feng Hao
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Feng Hao
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Dan Harkins