Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 21 November 2018 13:52 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 05:51:28 -0800
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 11:28 PM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>; wrote:

> Although, if I am correct, the epectation is that all of this data
> will be used without mandating DNSSEC validation, so all these
> security parameters could be modified by any DNS party in transit
> to try and break the protocol or privacy of the user.
>

Yes, because being able to modify the A/AAAA records is generally
sufficient to
determine the SNI. See:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-02#section-7.1

-Ekr