Re: [Tools-discuss] Phasing out TLS 1.0/1.1 on IETF services

Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com> Mon, 27 June 2022 13:58 UTC

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Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 08:57:52 -0500
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To: "Eric Vyncke (evyncke)" <evyncke=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tools-discuss@ietf.org" <tools-discuss@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
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From: Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [Tools-discuss] Phasing out TLS 1.0/1.1 on IETF services
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I will make the change to configuration at CloudFlare tomorrow, early 
afternoon US Central. Only HTTPS traffic going through CloudFlare to 
*.ietf.org web services will be affected.

RjS

On 6/24/22 12:51 AM, Eric Vyncke (evyncke) wrote:
>
> Dear all, (please reply to tools-discuss@ietf.org only)
>
> Based on feedback from our penetration testing contractor, and 
> taking RFC8996[1]into consideration, the IETFwill begin phasing out 
> TLS 1.0 and 1.1 on IETF servicesin the coming days,
>
> We will begin [2] with requiring TLS 1.2 and above at Cloudflare and 
> monitor for issues[3]. We will then proceed making similar changes to 
> other services.
>
> Regards,
>
> -éric
>
> (liaison to the tools team for the IESG)
>
> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8996 Deprecating TLS 1.0 
> and TLS 1.1
>
> [2] we will announce the change 24 hour in advance
>
> [3] monitoring potential drops in connection statistics as well as 
> opened cases
>
>
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