IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [tram] Allow TURN to forward inbound connectivity checks without permission

Simon Perreault <sperreault@jive.com> Tue, 20 March 2018 12:17 UTC

Return-Path: <sperreault@jive.com>
X-Original-To: tram@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tram@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 156EE12702E for <tram@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 05:17:54 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=jive.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id dMU4X4AVQ_zN for <tram@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 05:17:52 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-ot0-x230.google.com (mail-ot0-x230.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4003:c0f::230]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D23D8126DFB for <tram@ietf.org>; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 05:17:50 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-ot0-x230.google.com with SMTP id m22-v6so1426042otf.10 for <tram@ietf.org>; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 05:17:50 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=jive.com; s=google; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=u0lAsGaGJsy4hlbi2/LOne1h6tBXTktkeM0X8mp7dC8=; b=BZVjwvbpNZkBER+MaCU4yjjyFAhkUQQAe8B4nupiDEvcWMzsB79Ueyy+aL0Bt3qUt4 B7ECgYjiA5yNAKjsH56dselWPv1tA4x4iHmovH7gHLY/oI3u63EgYDHuSWfKT1SdB8Fi Qq/tNy6FMJnqGdJzt9sCKKu1ofmPsAPfdw8V+AaSCoYFmpHaPWM/gN07ZCOFNR5Qvawu qrLtA0pAdzrTySoqQPoCEUgOZpSr1IYTMOxceLzhFhdaBmJ8ag046qSRcWr9RWR0CmVp aKS9TBqbApRzV+V6g0DatWR7p1s9aCay61h+HwXLbRzBoYVBtDDXxJTI0Scix+2J6LZU bFEQ==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=u0lAsGaGJsy4hlbi2/LOne1h6tBXTktkeM0X8mp7dC8=; b=MrzCJTHolWtB7v6c/NMnlSBKAPHap9N5VhDb7AJvR9f3zXyKG9cQMkQ+BxGjunHEjR RNNz+F2pnd0fHLww1/ItqjdhkUttse1zDRi4jR8ksv37UBuHbw5SWAr0KOYO848GgOTK 3alp/GOia6IBQlSjGsYV4GqX/1U15Ml1yB2SxtPLQv4UMvHEruT9w++Qs9lWmpvwTe9L fEQnBT+koVV5YCysk375o5zTxSlBy0Jmy9jHqKvktsP5pTI9v/0KXCCt50ytSsFvrBmc xy2ABet/hXDcsc1kPgTGLlennJu5Wn/9pPGvxETdv7CYe8Ia0qIlVddfa+Uy1YHsNHnO qFIg==
X-Gm-Message-State: AElRT7HTzUUp0ZX+LTL9XXITKSQJhUtrX0XVX9emVC2+UjQtmqnmpN/0 DZjckSyMVV4UaK7RF4qHQrGZJonwK6Pn6wpa8Kq/jg==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AG47ELukYv5f9+C0IG9G5agRbakKa9jCMBFOM5L2sGQfMfFt5xlR8NnpZ3JByiMBmhq8FNr6E/5Jt5wRfKr27chmH8A=
X-Received: by 2002:a9d:6218:: with SMTP id g24-v6mr5175072otj.76.1521548270153; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 05:17:50 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.74.203.132 with HTTP; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 05:17:29 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <BN6PR16MB14253012D6A5EA47A700EE1FEAAB0@BN6PR16MB1425.namprd16.prod.outlook.com>
References: <CANO7kWDd8NZ=svBONwzo6sE5YH3Y5MAdWFP2CQMiTg7M-b47AQ@mail.gmail.com> <c9ef837c-bf7c-decb-9542-8a9ddeda67fd@akamai.com> <E3AB81FC-D841-47A6-A0E2-775461779770@mozilla.com> <CANO7kWA4tmK7Di59tsjvCBoDdh-jW83FxMpqQH1-iSPGLS=mpA@mail.gmail.com> <BN6PR16MB14253012D6A5EA47A700EE1FEAAB0@BN6PR16MB1425.namprd16.prod.outlook.com>
From: Simon Perreault <sperreault@jive.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 08:17:29 -0400
Message-ID: <CANO7kWD3rpCOrgjcLrkVfh0ZF5nrDs+cRnB02VgMHHW1axSRMg@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy" <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@mcafee.com>
Cc: Nils Ohlmeier <nohlmeier@mozilla.com>, Cullen Jennings <fluffy@cisco.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, "tram@ietf.org" <tram@ietf.org>, Brandon Williams <brandon.williams@akamai.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000026e7eb0567d71073"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tram/DNCPhF7L9ZRdv4ljq4Fifp4Ne30>
Subject: Re: [tram] Allow TURN to forward inbound connectivity checks without permission
X-BeenThere: tram@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Discussing the creation of a Turn Revised And Modernized \(TRAM\) WG, which goal is to consolidate the various initiatives to update TURN and STUN." <tram.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tram>, <mailto:tram-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tram/>
List-Post: <mailto:tram@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tram-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tram>, <mailto:tram-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 12:17:54 -0000

2018-03-20 10:31 GMT+00:00 Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <
TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@mcafee.com>:

> the TURN client could be subjected to DDoS attack (e.g. spoofed STUN
> packets from attackers, client wastes cycles validating the message
> integrity, and could also be subjected to bandwidth-hogging attack).
>

That would be new to TURN, but not new to the client: NAT pinholes, created
with STUN or otherwise, expose the client similarly. So while this is
certainly worth mentioning in the security considerations section, I don't
see this as a blocker.

I also can't think of a way that this could be exploited to mount any kind
of practical attack against a specific target...

Simon

v2.19.0 | Report a Bug | By Email