Re: [tram] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-tram-turnbis-27: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

["Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy" <[e-mail]>]

Hi Ben,

Please see inline 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>
> Sent: Friday, July 19, 2019 1:40 AM
> To: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <[e-mail]>
> Cc: The IESG <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]; draft-ietf-tram-
> [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: [tram] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-tram-turnbis-27:
> (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
> 
> This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or
> open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is
> safe.
> 
> On Sat, Jul 13, 2019 at 06:10:55AM +0000, Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy wrote:
> > Hi Ben,
> >
> > Please see inline
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>
> > > Sent: Saturday, July 13, 2019 7:45 AM
> > > To: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
> <[e-mail]>
> > > Cc: The IESG <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]; draft-ietf-tram-
> > > [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> > > Subject: Re: [tram] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-tram-turnbis-
> 27:
> > > (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
> > >
> > > This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click
> > > links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know
> > > the content is safe.
> > >
> > > Hi Tiru,
> > >
> > > On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 03:47:19PM +0000, Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
> wrote:
> > > > Hi Ben,
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for the detailed review. Please see inline
> > >
> > > Sorry to have made you deduplicate with the reviews that had already
> > > come in -- I wrote this text fairly early (on just the diff) with
> > > intent to return and tidy up, but ran out of time and had to just submit
> what I had.
> >
> > No problem, the review helped to improve the draft.
> >
> > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: tram <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Benjamin Kaduk
> > > > > via Datatracker
> > > > > Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2019 11:10 AM
> > > > > To: The IESG <[e-mail]>
> > > > > Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail];
> > > > > [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> > > > > Subject: [tram] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on
> > > > > draft-ietf-tram-turnbis-27: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
> > > > > draft-ietf-tram-turnbis-27: Discuss
> > > > >
> > > > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply
> > > > > to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel
> > > > > free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.)
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Please refer to
> > > > > https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> > > > > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> > > > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tram-turnbis/
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > ----
> > > > > --
> > > > > DISCUSS:
> > > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > ----
> > > > > --
> > > > >
> > > > > I support Roman's Discuss.
> > > >
> > > > I have updated the draft to address Roman's Discuss.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > I think I'm confused about whether REQUESTED-ADDRESS-FAMILY
> and
> > > > > ADDITIONAL-ADDRESS-FAMILY are mutually exclusive.
> > > >
> > > > Yes, both attributes are mutually exclusive. It is discussed in
> > > > Section 7.1,
> > > Clients MUST NOT include REQUESTED-ADDRESS-FAMILY and
> ADDITIONAL-
> > > ADDRESS-FAMILY attributes in the same request.
> > >
> > > Okay.  This seems weird to  me and I wouldn't object if some very
> > > blunt text was added early on about "when both IPv4 and IPv6 are
> > > desired, the ADDITIONAL-ADDRESS-FAMILY attribute alone serves to
> > > request both address types; otherwise the single
> > > REQUESTED-ADDRESS-FAMILY attribute suffices", but this point clearly is
> not Discuss-worthy.
> >
> > This point is already covered in Section 5 (General Behavior) as follows:
> >
> > TURN, as defined in this specification, supports both IPv4 and IPv6. IPv6
> support in TURN includes IPv4-to-IPv6, IPv6-to-IPv6, and IPv6-to-IPv4
> relaying. The REQUESTED-ADDRESS-FAMILY attribute allows a client to
> explicitly request the address type the TURN server will allocate (e.g., an
> IPv4-only node may request the TURN server to allocate an IPv6 address).
> The ADDITIONAL-ADDRESS-FAMILY attribute allows a client to request the
> server to allocate one IPv4 and one IPv6 relay address in a single Allocate
> request. This saves local ports on the client and reduces the number of
> messages sent between the client and the TURN server.
> 
> I was thinking more like "When only a single address type is desired, the
> REQUESTED-ADDRESS-FAMILY attribute is used to explicitly request [...].
> If both IPv4 and IPv6 are desired, the single ADDITIONAL-ADDRESS-FAMILY
> attribute indicates a request to the server to allocate [...]".

Works for me, updated draft.

> 
> > >
> > > > > Does sending just the
> > > > > "additional" one secretly mean that you want both v4 and v6?
> > > >
> > > > Yes, ADDITIONAL-ADDRESS-FAMILY is used for allocation of both IPv4
> > > > and
> > > IPv6.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 5
> > > > >
> > > > > I see that the secdir reviewer asked about why it is a "SHOULD"
> > > > > to send SOFTWARE, and only got a response that it is defined in
> > > > > stunbis, but not about why it is recommended.  There remain some
> > > > > privacy/security considerations with it, and we should either
> > > > > point to the stunbis security considerations or not recommend using it.
> > > > > (FINGERPRINT is, IIRC, less interesting from a security
> > > > > perspective as it's just about confirming that given traffic is
> > > > > in fact STUN and not something else.)
> > > >
> > > > This "SHOULD" to send SOFTWARE attribute is defined in RFC5766 (As
> > > > you
> > > may know, TURN is used in the field for several years) and turnbis
> > > does not modify the behavior for backward compatibility, and to
> > > address the possible threat added the following lines:
> > > >
> > > > SOFTWARE attribute can reveal the specific software version of the
> > > > TURN
> > > client and server to eavesdropper and it might possibly allow
> > > attacks against vulnerable software that is known to contain
> > > security holes. If it is important to prevent an eavesdropper from
> > > learning the software version, TURN can be run over (D)TLS.
> > >
> > > (let's keep this on the secdir thread)
> >
> > Okay.
> >
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 12
> > > > >
> > > > > Do we need to say anything about backwards compatibility with
> > > > > RFC
> > > > > 5766 peers that use a wider range of channel IDs?
> > > >
> > > > Yes, added the following line:
> > > > Note that the channel number range is not backwards compatible
> > > > with [RFC5766], and cannot be used in environments where such
> > > > compatibility is required.
> > >
> > > I see now that Adam also raised this topic, and I'd like to hear his
> > > thoughts on this proposed text.  Since we normally don't make breaking
> changes in "bis"
> > > documents, I'd also like to hear a bit more about what knoweldge we
> > > have (if
> > > any) about implementations that might be affected and are not affected.
> >
> > Update to the TURN channel number range is done in
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7983#section-9.3 to distinguish multiplexed
> protocols, and the range is updated in turnbis to align with RFC7983 .
> >
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 12.7
> > > > >
> > > > >    When the server receives an ICMP packet, the server processes it as
> > > > >    described in Section 11.5.  A Data indication MUST be sent regardless
> > > > >    of whether there is a channel bound to the peer that was the
> > > > >    destination of the UDP datagram that triggered the reception of the
> > > > >    ICMP packet.
> > > > >
> > > > > This MUST seems potentially in conflict with the previous
> > > > > discussion about permissions checks in Section 11.5.
> > > >
> > > > Good catch, removed conflicting text from Section 12.7.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 20
> > > > >
> > > > > Looking at the
> > > > > new nonce in the example
> ("obMatJos2AAABadl7W7PeDU4hKE72jda"),
> > > and
> > > > > noting that it starts with the nonce cookie, help me decode the
> > > > > security feature bits.  The magic prefix is "obMatJos2" so the
> > > > > capability bits are encoded as "AAAB", which decodes to (hex) 00
> > > > > 00 01.  But stunbis says that the bits are ordered from 0 (MSB
> > > > > of first
> > > > > byte) to 23 (LSB of last byte), so this would have bit 23 set,
> > > > > which is in contrast to the registry marking bit 0 as the
> > > > > password-algorithms
> > > feature.  Where am I messing this up?
> > > >
> > > > You are right, replaced with "obMatJos2gAAAadl7W7PeDU4hKE72jda"
> > > > (hex)
> > > > 80 00 00
> > >
> > > It's reassuring to know that I wasn't missing something obvious; thanks!
> >
> > Thanks for catching it :)
> >
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > I'd prefer if the examples showed more usage of
> > > > > MESSAGE-INTEGRITY-
> > > > > SHA256 (especially, any from the server) and fewer MESSAGE-
> INTEGRITY.
> > > >
> > > > Sure, updated examples.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > ----
> > > > > --
> > > > > COMMENT:
> > > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > ----
> > > > > --
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks for keeping the diff from RFC 5766 relatively contained!
> > > > > I only reviewed the diff due to time constraints, but in general
> > > > > support reviewing the full document for internal consistency and
> > > > > any remarks that have not aged well, especially with respect to
> > > > > IANA
> > > considerations.
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 2
> > > > >
> > > > > RFC 8174 has an updated version of the BCP 14 boilerplate text.
> > > >
> > > > Fixed.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 3.1
> > > > >
> > > > > I appreciate the response to the secdir review, but even the
> > > > > linked stunbis section does not say much about which PKI's trust
> > > > > root is expected to be used.  I'm forced to assume the Web PKI
> > > > > but don't have much grounds for that assumption.
> > > >
> > > > Yes, use pre-populated trust store on the endpoint to validate the
> > > certificate path.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 3.2
> > > > >
> > > > > The secdir reviewer's comments seem to have some relevance.
> > > > > It seems like even when the third-party authorization mechanism
> > > > > is used, the client is still limited to "the server is
> > > > > authenticated because it gives me the service I asked for",
> > > > > which is not really documented anywhere yet.  The long-term
> > > > > password mechanism at least generates an HMAC integrity tag on
> > > > > messages from server to client, which can provide some level of
> authentication via key confirmation.
> > > >
> > > > No, STURN third-party authorization provides message integrity for
> > > > both
> > > request and response messages (please see
> > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7635#section-5).  The mac_key to
> > > compute the message integrity can change per call and this mechanism
> > > is better than the long-term password mechanism. Note that WebRTC
> > > uses third-party authorization mechanism.
> > >
> > > Ah, that's reassuring to learn.  Sorry for the confusion.
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section  3.7
> > > > >
> > > > >                                        If the TURN server carrying out
> > > > >    packet translation from IPv4-to-IPv6 cannot get the Don't Fragment
> > > > >    (DF) bit in the IPv4 header, it MUST reject the Allocate request with
> > > > >    DONT-FRAGMENT attribute.
> > > > >
> > > > > nit: does "cannot get" mean something like "read the value as
> > > > > sent on the wire" (e.g., due to implementation/API limitations)?
> > > >
> > > > Yes, cannot read the value as sent on wire.
> > >
> > > I'd  suggest "is unable to access the state of", but that's entirely
> > > editorial and at your discretion.
> >
> > Thanks, updated.
> >
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 6
> > > > >
> > > > >    o  the relayed transport address or addresses;
> > > > >    [...]
> > > > >
> > > > >    [...]
> > > > >    address.  The relayed transport address MUST be unique across all
> > > > >    allocations, so it can be used to uniquely identify the allocation.
> > > > >
> > > > > nit: there's maybe a singular/plural mismatch going on here, but
> > > > > I don't have any good ideas.
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 7.1
> > > > >
> > > > >    If the client wishes to obtain one IPv6 and one IPv4 relayed
> > > > >    transport address then it includes an ADDITIONAL-ADDRESS-FAMILY
> > > > >    attribute in the request.  This attribute specifies that the server
> > > > >    must allocate both address types.  The attribute value in the
> > > > >    ADDITIONAL-ADDRESS-FAMILY MUST be set to 0x02 (IPv6 address
> > > family).
> > > > >    Clients MUST NOT include REQUESTED-ADDRESS-FAMILY and
> > > ADDITIONAL-
> > > > >    ADDRESS-FAMILY attributes in the same request.  [...]
> > > > >
> > > > > This reads like setting REQUESTED-ADDRESS-FAMILY and
> ADDITIONAL-
> > > > > ADDRESS-FAMILY are mutually exclusive.  Is that the correct reading?
> > > >
> > > > Yes.
> > > >
> > > > > (Naively, one might expect that the thing named "additional"
> > > > > is applied on top of the base-level request, so I have to ask.)
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 7.2
> > > > >
> > > > > Why do we only have a SHOULD-level requirement for
> > > > > authentication of Allocate requests where 5766 had MUST?  Could
> > > > > we say "may allow unauthenticated requests in order to support
> > > > > [use case] but otherwise MUST require authentication" (with
> > > > > better wording)?  I suppose this has probably been discussed ad
> > > > > nauseum already, so feel free to point me at the archives before
> getting into an actual discussion.
> > > >
> > > > You missed the next line, it says the authentication of the
> > > > request is optional to allow TURN servers provided by the local or
> > > > access network to accept Allocation requests from new and/or guest
> > > > users in the network who do not necessarily possess long term
> > > > credentials for STUN authentication and its security implications
> > > > are discussed in [RFC8155].
> > >
> > > I saw the next line; the current formulation also allows non-use of
> > > authentication in other  situations, which is why I suggested an
> > > alternate wording.
> > >
> > > > The WG spent several cycles discussing the downgrade of a MUST
> > > > level
> > > requirement (please see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8155#section-9).
> > >
> > > To be clear, I do not object to removing the MUST for the local-use
> > > case; I'm concerned with the wording of the text that, as written,
> > > also weakens the requirement for all other cases.
> >
> > Got it, updated step as follows:
> >
> >    1.   The TURN server provided by the local or access network MAY
> >         allow unauthenticated request in order to accept Allocation
> >         requests from new and/or guest users in the network who do not
> >         necessarily possess long term credentials for STUN
> >         authentication and its security implications are discussed in
> >         [RFC8155].  Otherwise, the server MUST require that the request
> >         be authenticated.  If the request is authenticated, the
> >         authentication MUST be done either using the long-term credential
> >         mechanism of [I-D.ietf-tram-stunbis] or the STUN Extension for
> >         Third-Party Authorization [RFC7635] unless the client and server
> >         agree to use another mechanism through some procedure outside
> >         the scope of this document.
> 
> That should work (though I wonder if the RFC Editor will tweak things, since
> the "otherwise" is separated by another sentence from the initial case it's
> contrasting with).
> 
> I do note that the diff link you sent out also removes some text (in a 4.x or
> 5.x section?) about "the server MUST demand that all requests from the
> client be authenticated" after the "MUST implement [long-term credentials]"
> requirement.  

Yes, removed above text from Section 5 to avoid discussing the requirement normatively twice (Thanks to the suggestion from Mirja).

> It might be worth making a forward reference from that
> location to this text, if possible.

Done, update text as follows:
TURN servers and clients MUST implement this mechanism, and the authentication options are discussed in Section 7.2.

Cheers,
-Tiru

> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Ben
> 
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > >    7.   If the server does not support the address family requested by
> > > > >         the client in REQUESTED-ADDRESS-FAMILY or is disabled by local
> > > > >         policy, it MUST generate an Allocate error response, and it MUST
> > > > >         include an ERROR-CODE attribute with the 440 (Address Family
> not
> > > > >         Supported) response code.  [...]
> > > > >
> > > > > nit: "or is disabled" needs a subject.
> > > >
> > > > Fixed, updated text as follows:
> > > > If the server does not support the address family requested by the
> > > > client in
> > > REQUESTED-ADDRESS-FAMILY or if the allocation of the requested
> > > address family is disabled by local policy, it MUST generate an
> > > Allocate error response, and it MUST include an ERROR-CODE attribute
> > > with the 440 (Address Family not Supported) response code.
> > >
> > > Thanks
> > >
> > > > >    9.   The server checks if the request contains an ADDITIONAL-
> ADDRESS-
> > > > >         FAMILY attribute.  If yes, and the attribute value is 0x01 (IPv4
> > > > >         address family), then the server rejects the request with a 400
> > > > >         (Bad Request) error.  Otherwise, the server checks if it can
> > > > >         allocate relayed transport addresses of both address types.  If
> > > > >         the server cannot satisfy the request, then the server
> > > > > rejects
> > > > >
> > > > > What are "both" address types?
> > > >
> > > > Both IPv4 and IPv6 address families.
> > >
> > > I guess once I realize that "ADDITIONAL-ADDRESS-FAMILY" is just code
> > > for
> > > "IPv4 and IPv6" with no other options, this doesn't look as unclear.
> > >
> > > > > We only have the ADDITIONAL-ADDRESS- FAMILY (which contains
> one
> > > > > type) and no REQUESTED-ADDRESS-FAMILY.
> > > >
> > > > If ADDITIONAL-ADDRESS-FAMILY is used, the server will allocate
> > > > both IPv4
> > > and IPv6 relayed transport addresses.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 8.1
> > > > >
> > > > >    When refreshing a dual allocation, the client includes REQUESTED-
> > > > >    ADDRESS-FAMILY attribute indicating the address family type that
> > > > >    should be refreshed.  If no REQUESTED-ADDRESS-FAMILY is
> > > > > included
> > > then
> > > > >    the request should be treated as applying to all current allocations.
> > > > >    The client MUST only include family types it previously allocated and
> > > > >    has not yet deleted.  [...]
> > > > >
> > > > > I'm a bit confused about "only include family types" plural; I
> > > > > thought there could only be at most one REQUESTED-ADDRESS-
> FAMILY
> > > and
> > > > > that it would only indicate one family type.  So how could
> > > > > there be multiple types getting included by the client?
> > > >
> > > > Good catch, replaced "types" with "type"
> > >
> > > (It needs a definite article, then for "only include the family
> > > type")
> >
> > Done.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > -Tiru
> >
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 11.5
> > > > >
> > > > > [check that "type and code" is valid in both ICMPv4 and v6]
> > > >
> > > > Yes, it is valid.
> > >
> > > Sorry; that was supposed to be a note to myself!
> > > But yes, luckily for me this is not the point of difference between
> > > ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 that I was vaguely remembering.
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 12
> > > > >
> > > > >    Reserved values may be used in the future by other protocols.
> When
> > > > >    the client uses channel binding, it MUST comply with the
> > > > >    demultiplexing scheme discussed above.
> > > > >
> > > > > "channel binding" is a term of art in the security world; is
> > > > > this usage intended to roughly mean "channel multiplexing"?
> > > > > (I do see that the subsections are talking about the specific
> > > > > ChannelBind request, so I assume so; I just want to double
> > > > > check.)
> > > >
> > > > Yes,  a channel binding is created or refreshed using a
> > > > ChannelBind
> > > transaction (Please see Section 12.1).
> > >
> > > Great.  Well, not great that there's a collision of jargon, but it's
> > > way too late to do anything about, now.
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 13
> > > > >
> > > > >    The descriptions below have two parts: a preferred behavior and an
> > > > >    alternate behavior.  The server SHOULD implement the preferred
> > > > >    behavior.  Otherwise, the server MUST implement the alternate
> > > > >    behavior and MUST NOT do anything else for the reasons detailed in
> > > > >    [RFC7915].  [...]
> > > > >
> > > > > RFC 5766 had this split on a per-field basis, but this text
> > > > > suggests that if the preferred behavior is not possible for a
> > > > > given field, then the alternate behavior is used for the entire packet.
> > > > > I note that section 14 does retain the "for a particular field"
> > > > > language for UDP-to-UDP relaying, as do section 15 for
> > > > > TCP-to-UDP relaying and section 16 for UDP-to-TCP relaying.
> > > >
> > > > Good point, fixed text as follows:
> > > > Otherwise, if that is not possible for a particular field, the
> > > > server MUST
> > > implement the alternate behavior and MUST NOT do anything else for
> > > the reasons detailed in [RFC7915].
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 13.2
> > > > >
> > > > > Is this flow label text consistent with both the inbound and
> > > > > outbound translation directions (specifically, using
> > > > > relayed/peer addresses in the 5- tuple to identify the flow)?
> > > > >
> > > > >       If the incoming packet did not include a Fragment header and the
> > > > >       outgoing packet size exceeds the outgoing link's MTU, the TURN
> > > > >       server drops the outgoing packet and send an ICMP message of
> type
> > > > >       2 code 0 ("Packet too big") to the sender of the incoming packet.
> > > > >        If the packet is being sent to the peer, the TURN server reduces
> > > > >       the MTU reported in the ICMP message by 48 bytes to allow room
> for
> > > > >       the overhead of a Data indication.
> > > > >
> > > > > (nit?) "If the packet is being send to the peer" seems to
> > > > > grammatically refer to the outgoing packet that would exceed
> > > > > link MTU, as opposed to the ICMP message being generated.  But I
> > > > > think it's supposed to refer to the ICMP message being
> > > > > generated, which has
> > > not yet been referred to as a "packet"
> > > > > in this text.
> > > >
> > > > Suresh raised the same comment, fixed text as follows:
> > > > If the ICMPv6 packet ("Packet too big") is being sent to the peer,
> > > > the TURN
> > > server reduces the MTU reported in the ICMP message by 48 bytes to
> > > allow room for the overhead of a Data indication.
> > >
> > > Great; t hanks
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 13.3
> > > > >
> > > > > [Same comment about ICMP packet generation/grammar]
> > > >
> > > > Fixed text as follows:
> > > > If the ICMPv4 packet (Destination Unreachable (Type 3) with Code
> > > > 4) is
> > > being sent to the peer, the TURN server SHOULD reduce the MTU
> > > reported in the ICMP message by 48 bytes to allow room for the
> > > overhead of a Data indication.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 15
> > > > >
> > > > > Maybe note that SIP and WebRTC are the primary consumers of
> TURN?
> > > >
> > > > Yes, it is mentioned in several places in the document that WebRTC
> > > > and SIP
> > > use TURN.
> > >
> > > Okay; my fault for only looking at the diff, probably.
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > >                                                         Even if both
> > > > >    TCP-AO and UDP authentication would be used between TURN
> > > > > client
> > > and
> > > > >    server, it would not change the end-to-end security properties of
> the
> > > > >    UDP payload being relayed.  [...]
> > > > >
> > > > > I wonder if we even need to say "UDP" in "payload being relayed".
> > > >
> > > > Replaced "UDP" with "application"
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 16
> > > > >
> > > > >    Fragmentation
> > > > >
> > > > >       Preferred Behavior: Any fragmented packets are reassembled in
> the
> > > > >       server and then forwarded to the client over the TCP connection.
> > > > >       ICMP messages resulting from the UDP datagrams sent to the peer
> > > > >       MUST be forwarded to the client using TURN's mechanism for
> > > > >       relevant ICMP types and codes.
> > > > >
> > > > > As in section 12.7, I wonder if this MUST could be seen as
> > > > > overriding other logic for ICMP handling.
> > > >
> > > > Modified text for clarity as follows:
> > > >
> > > > ICMP messages resulting from the UDP datagrams sent to the peer
> > > > are processed by the server as described in Section 11.5 and
> > > > forwarded to the client using TURN's mechanism for relevant ICMP
> types and codes.
> > >
> > > Thanks
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 21.16
> > > > >
> > > > > I agree with the secdir reviewer that there is at least
> > > > > potential for username and realm to be sensitive.
> > > >
> > > > I proposed to add the following text:
> > > >
> > > >    If the TURN client and server use the STUN Extension for Third-Party
> > > >    Authorization [RFC7635] (for example it is used in WebRTC), the
> > > >    username does not reveal the real user's identity, the USERNAME
> > > >    attribute carries an ephemeral and unique key identifier.  If the
> > > >    TURN client and server use the STUN long-term credential mechanism
> > > >    and the username reveals the real user's identity, the client needs
> > > >    to use (D)TLS transport between the client and the server or use the
> > > >    USERHASH attribute instead of the USERNAME attribute to
> anonynmize
> > > >    the username.
> > > >
> > > >    If the TURN client and server use the STUN long-term credential
> > > >    mechanism and realm information is privacy sensitive, TURN can be
> run
> > > >    over (D)TLS.  As a reminder, STUN Extension for Third-Party
> > > >    Authorization does not use realm.
> > >
> > > Excellent; thank you!
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 21.4
> > > > >
> > > > > Do we need references for Teredo and/or 6to4?
> > > >
> > > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6156 did not add references to
> > > > Teredo and
> > > 6to4.
> > >
> > > Okay; just wanted to check.
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 22
> > > > >
> > > > >    The codepoints for the STUN error codes defined in this
> specification
> > > > >    are listed in Section 19.  [IANA is requested to update the reference
> > > > >    from [RFC5766] to RFC-to-be for the STUN error codes listed in
> > > > >    Section 19.]
> > > > >
> > > > > (I think some of them are from RFC 6156 as well as from 5766.)
> > > >
> > > > Yes, added RFC6156.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 23
> > > > >
> > > > > It seems prudent to revisit these listed IAB Considerations for
> > > > > whether the situation has changed in the past ten years (though
> > > > > I don't have any specific points that I would change).
> > > > >
> > > > > Section 25
> > > > >
> > > > > (nit) are these really "updates" to RFC 6156 so much as
> > > > > incorporating its content wholesale into the core TURN specification?
> > > >
> > > > Yes, several sections in RFC6156 are updated.
> > >
> > > Okay, thanks.
> > >
> > > -Ben
> >