Re: [tram] Mirja Kühlewind's Discuss on draft-ietf-tram-turnbis-27: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

["Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy" <[e-mail]>]

Hi Mirja,

Thanks for the review. Please see inline

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> From: tram <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Mirja Kühlewind via
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> Sent: Wednesday, July 10, 2019 9:25 PM
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> Subject: [tram] Mirja Kühlewind's Discuss on draft-ietf-tram-turnbis-27: (with
> DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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> Mirja Kühlewind has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tram-turnbis-27: Discuss
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> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> One quick discussion which probably is only an oversight and therefore
> should be easy got fix:
> 
> I'm bit confused about the requirement on using authentication. This draft
> says in section 5 (as RFC5766 does):
> 
> "The server MUST demand that all requests
>    from the client be authenticated using this mechanism, or that a
>    equally strong or stronger mechanism for client authentication is
>    used."
> 
> However, RFC 8155 which is even now cited in this draft, updates RFC5766
> and relaxes this requirement. Later in the section 7.2. this draft says:
> 
> "The server SHOULD require that the request be authenticated."
> 
> I assume the requirement in section 5 is an oversight?

Yes, removed the requirement in Section 5.

> 
> I also recommend to only specify this requirement normatively in one place.

Done, updated step 1 in Section 5 to address the comment from Ben as follows:

   1.   The TURN server provided by the local or access network MAY
        allow unauthenticated request in order to accept Allocation
        requests from new and/or guest users in the network who do not
        necessarily possess long term credentials for STUN
        authentication and its security implications are discussed in
        [RFC8155].  Otherwise, the server MUST require that the request
        be authenticated.  If the request is authenticated, the
        authentication MUST be done either using the long-term
        credential mechanism of [I-D.ietf-tram-stunbis] or the STUN
        Extension for Third-Party Authorization [RFC7635] unless the
        client and server agree to use another mechanism through some
        procedure outside the scope of this document.

> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Some other technical comments/questions:
> 
> 1) Sec 3.7:
> "or use UDP fragmentation [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-udp-options]."
> I believe the possibility to use UDP fragmentation was brought up by the
> TSV-ART review (Thanks Joe!). However, I would like to mention that this can
> only be used if supported by both endpoints and that should probably also
> be remarked here. The next sentence in the draft indicated this by saying
> "until UDP fragmentation support is available", however, this actually seem
> to be editorially a bit misplaced there and could explain more. See also this
> text in
> draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options:
> 
> "FRAG needs to be used with extreme care because it will present
>    incorrect datagram boundaries to a legacy receiver, unless encoded
>    as LITE data (see Section 5.8)."
> 
> Also note that draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options is still under development and
> we don't have much deployment experience with it yet.

Yes, Joe suggest the above change. I have added the following line:
Note that the UDP fragmentation option needs to be supported by both endpoints, and at the time of writing of this document, UDP fragmentation support is under discussion and is not deployed.

> 
> And further, in the same section. There is also draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-
> plpmtud on "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for Datagram
> Transports". Please also be aware that there is an extensive TSV-ART for
> draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud. Both might impact the final content of this
> section.

The draft does not refer to draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram- plpmtud. 

> 
> 2) sec 11.5:
> "When the server receives an ICMP packet, the server verifies that the
>    type is either 3 or 11 for an ICMPv4 [RFC0792] packet or either 1, 2,
>    or 3 for an ICMPv6 [RFC4443] packet."
> Restricting to a set of known types, doesn't seem to support future
> extensibility very well...

Good point, added the following lines:
New ICMP types or codes can be defined in future specifications. If the server receives an ICMP error packet, and the new type or code field can help the client to make use of the ICMP error notification and generate feedback to the application layer, the server sends the Data indication with an ICMP attribute conveying the new ICMP type or code.

> 
> 3) sec 12.5:
> "Over TCP and TLS-over-TCP, the ChannelData message MUST be padded to
>    a multiple of four bytes in order to ensure the alignment of
>    subsequent messages."
> Not exactly sure why this is useful...? Is this to align with STUN and therefore
> make processing somehow easier? Is that really needed. And exception
> should be easy to implement and should save some bytes which is the as I
> understood it the whole purpose of channels, no?

This behavior is not new, it is defined and deployed in TURN https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5766#section-11.5 

> 
> 4) 12.6:
> "Note that if
>    the Length field in the ChannelData message is 0, then there will be
>    no data in the UDP datagram, but the UDP datagram is still formed and
>    sent."
> Can you maybe add some more text and explain why this is useful?

Sure, added reference to Section 4.1 in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6263 

> 
> 5) sec 15:
> RFC6824 will soon be obsoleted by draft-ietf-mptcp-rfc6824bis and please
> s/TCP multi-path/Multipath TCP/.

Thanks, updated.

> 
> 6) Just a thought looking at section 14 and 16: It could have been nice to
> provide an ECN feedback field from the server to the client in case a ECN
> marked packet is received from the peer... however, I guess that future
> work at this point in the process...
> 
> 7) sec 18.13: Maybe I missed this because I reviewed this doc over 3 days, but
> is only the ICMP Attribute send to the client or is the actual ICMP packets or
> as much as possible of that packet includes as well?

Yes, only the ICMP attribute is sent to the client.

> 
> 8) sec 23:
> "Response: TURN will no longer be needed once there are no longer any
>    NATs.  Unfortunately, as of the date of publication of this document,
>    it no longer seems very likely that NATs will go away any time soon.
>    However, the need for TURN will also decrease as the number of NATs
>    with the mapping property of Endpoint-Independent Mapping [RFC4787]
>    increases."
> Yes... so you don't think that IPv6 will be any help here?

Yes, IPv6 will not help in some scenarios, updated Introduction to list them.

   In many enterprise networks, direct UDP transmissions are not
   permitted between clients on the internal networks and external IP
   addresses.  To permit media sessions in such a situation to use UDP
   and to avoid forcing the media sessions through TCP, Enterprise
   Firewall can be configured to allow UDP traffic relayed through an
   Enterprise relay server.  This scenario is required to be supported
   by the WebRTC requirements (Section 2.3.5.1 in [RFC7478]).  In
   addition, in a SIP or WebRTC call, if the user wants IP location
   privacy from the peer then the client can select a relay server
   offering IP location privacy and only convey the relayed candidates
   to the peer for ICE connectivity checks (see Section 4.2.4 in
   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security]). 

> 
> Editorial comments:
> 
> 1) Sec 6:
> "The relayed transport address MUST be unique across all
>    allocations, so it can be used to uniquely identify the allocation.
> 
>    Both the relayed transport address and the 5-tuple MUST be unique
>    across all allocations, so either one can be used to uniquely
>    identify the allocation, [...]"
> These two sentences seem quite redundant. The first one was added in this
> draft. The second one was already there in RFC5766.

Thanks, removed the second sentence. 

> 
> 2) sec 7.1:
> "Since this specification only
>    allows UDP between the server and the peers, it is RECOMMENDED that
> [...]"
> Wordings ("only allows") seems weird to me given use of other proposals is
> at least to some extend discussed.

The specification does not allow any other protocol other than UDP between the server and peers (As you know, UDP is the preferred transport for media streams).

> 
> Nits:
> sec 7.1.: s/the client pick a currently unused transport address/the client
> picks a currently unused transport address/

Fixed.

Cheers,
-Tiru
> 
> 
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