[tram] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-tram-turn-third-party-authz-16: (with COMMENT)

"Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 29 May 2015 11:19 UTC

Return-Path: <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
X-Original-To: tram@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tram@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E4DD31A00DC; Fri, 29 May 2015 04:19:05 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RjQhRKB8gdrO; Fri, 29 May 2015 04:19:03 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A1151A00CF; Fri, 29 May 2015 04:19:03 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.0.3.p1
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Message-ID: <20150529111903.28945.85802.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Fri, 29 May 2015 04:19:03 -0700
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tram/vR_4uLTRAv9PP40js3e4rli9dcU>
Cc: tram-chairs@ietf.org, tram@ietf.org, draft-ietf-tram-turn-third-party-authz@ietf.org, gonzalo.camarillo@ericsson.com, draft-ietf-tram-turn-third-party-authz.ad@ietf.org, draft-ietf-tram-turn-third-party-authz.shepherd@ietf.org
Subject: [tram] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-tram-turn-third-party-authz-16: (with COMMENT)
X-BeenThere: tram@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
List-Id: "Discussing the creation of a Turn Revised And Modernized \(TRAM\) WG, which goal is to consolidate the various initiatives to update TURN and STUN." <tram.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tram>, <mailto:tram-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tram/>
List-Post: <mailto:tram@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tram-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tram>, <mailto:tram-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 29 May 2015 11:19:06 -0000

Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tram-turn-third-party-authz-16: No Objection

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)


Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.


The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tram-turn-third-party-authz/



----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------


Hiya,

I've cleared my remaining discuss point which was to ask
that the WG consider an alternative (and I think simpler)
scheme based on signatures. Some of that discussion has
happened so there's no reason to hold this up further. (I
hope the discussion of simpler methods continues but 
that will depend on people being interested.)

S

OLD COMMENTS: 

- As some others have said before, this is still not an easy
read and though better, could still do with more editorial
work.

- Why are 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 still just examples. You need one
to be MTI or you won't get interop. Indeed 4.1.2 says you
SHOULD do 4.1.1! Please just bite the bullet and clearly say
that 4.1.1 is MTI.

- 4.1.1, "HTTPS MUST be used for mutual authentication" is
not a very clear way to say it. You mean that HTTPS MUST be
used and that TLS with mutual authentication based on client
certificates MUST be used. How does the WebRTC server know
what CA the TURN server is going to use? That's another point
of pre-arrangement that will be needed.

- 4.1.1, I thought the web folks frowned upon specifying URI
parameters like that. Shouldn't you at least use a
.well-known URL or something so as to not get on someone
eles's lawn?

- 6.2, PATH_MTU is not the correct term. There are 
two paths involved, from WebRTC to browser and from
browser to TURN server and MTUs need not be the same
on those paths.

OLD COMMENTS BELOW HERE, I DIDN'T CHECK
THOSE.

- I really think this would benefit from some wider review
and I don't think it's ready as-is.

- I agree with Richard's discuss points.

- intro: "impossible in web applications" isn't really
true in principle, but impossible in WebRTC as it uses JS
is true. 

- Assuming the AS that can authorize the user shares a
secret with the STUN server chosen by the WebRTC server
seems very brittle. Why would that be true in general?

- 4.1.1: Hmmm. How many people use KeyProv I wonder?

- 4.1.2 - which "two servers"? WebRTC can have more
servers than that.

- 4.1.2 - now we're using TLS mutual auth? And how does
the TLS client know which CA to use that'll work with the
TLS server here? I don't think that'll scale will it?

- 4.1.3 - this looks like what the WG/authors really want,
would that be a fair statement?

- 9: Figure 2 should be way up at the top of the document
and not here

- 9: Why 5 seconds?