Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model

Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> Tue, 16 September 2014 16:12 UTC

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Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 20:12:25 +0400
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From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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Hello Stephen,

On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 6:22 PM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  Dmitry,
>
>  My fault. The certs with unnecessery permissions are a subject to be
> Monitored, not Audited.
>
> no problem.
>
>
>  There is a high-level description of the Auditors here:
> http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct:
> =====
> Auditors are lightweight software components that typically perform two
> functions. First, they can verify that logs are behaving correctly and are
> cryptographically consistent. If a log is not behaving properly, then the
> log will need to explain itself or risk being shut down. Second, they can
> verify that a particular certificate appears in a log. This is a
> particularly important auditing function because the Certificate
> Transparency framework requires that all SSL certificates be registered in
> a log. If a certificate has not been registered in a log, it’s a sign that
> the certificate is suspect, and TLS clients may refuse to connect to sites
> that have suspect certificates.
>  =====
> It is not integrated as a part of neither RFC 6962 nor current draft, but
> it provides a high-level explanation of the Auditors' role.
>
> Until this text is part of an IETF document, it doesn't enter into our
> discussion :-).
>
> Frankly it seems a bit counterproductive to have a separate site where
> info about CT is
> being posted, while we try to discuss 69269-bis in this WG.
>

I think that the information I have quoted should either become the part of
the RFC or should be removed from the site. The RFC says too little about
the Auditors functions.


-- 
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky