Re: [Trans] DNSSEC also needs CT

[Daniel Kahn Gillmor <[e-mail]>]

On 05/22/2014 01:47 PM, Osterweil, Eric wrote:
> If I understand your point (perhaps I don't) the type of ``honest[y]'' that you are talking about (in the Web PKI) refers to a CA vouching for a name binding that is illegitimate. How do you imagine this is possible in DNSSEC?  I could (for example) stand up a DNSSEC signed zone for someone else's zone, but because key verification and key learning are tied to the DNS delegation hierarchy, no resolver would learn of my doppelgänger zone, right

if i control zone foo.bar.example, and you control my parent zone
(bar.example), you can do the following:

 * make a new zone-signing key X

 * stand up an "authoritative" server for the foo.bar.example zone,
signed by X, with a DNSKEY record for X.

 * serve the appropriate DS record in the parent zone (bar.example) to
delegate foo.bar.example to X instead of the correct ZSK.

I'd very much like to know if you've ever done this rather than
publishing the correct DS.

DNSSEC-for-CT seems like one approach to be able to detect this kind of
misissuance.

	--dkg