Re: [Trans] EXTERNAL: DNSSEC also needs CT

[Tao Effect <[e-mail]>]

DNSSEC is certainly broken, but the solution to have a Frankenstein on your hands isn't to staple another Frankenstein onto its body.

DNSSEC insecurities and problems are well documented in the resource on this webpage:

http://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages.html

The solution to DNSSEC is *no* DNSSEC. DNSCrypt, DNSCurve, and DNSChain are all better solutions.

Likewise the solution to X.509 PKI problems is *no* X.509 PKI. X.509 is _fundamentally_ the wrong approach.

CT doesn't fix X.509 PKI, it merely gives the illusion of a fix, and still maintains today's global mass-surveillance state and requires people to pay money for insecurity:

http://lists.randombit.net/pipermail/cryptography/2014-April/006480.html

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.

On May 9, 2014, at 4:58 PM, Mehner, Carl <[e-mail]> wrote:

> RFC6698 says:
>> This chain is required to prevent a CA from avoiding blame
>>  by logging a partial or empty chain.  (Note: This effectively
>>  excludes self-signed and DANE-based certificates until some mechanism
>>  to control spam for those certificates is found.  The authors welcome
>>  suggestions.)
> 
> I propose:
> 
> To have a DANE certificate (not signed by a public CA) included into a CT log:
> 1) a pre-certificate be created
> 2) the pre-certificate submitted to a log
> 3) the log will verify based on a valid DANE record of type PKIX-EE
> 4) return a SCT to the submitter to include in the final certificate
> 
> 
> Carl Mehner
> 210.416.0942
> Info Security
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Trans [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of Nico Williams
> Sent: Friday, May 09, 2014 4:31 PM
> To: [e-mail]
> Subject: EXTERNAL: [Trans] DNSSEC also needs CT
> 
> DNSSEC is a PKI [of sorts; please, no need to pick nits about that].
> 
> It stands to reason that DNSSEC should have similar trust problems as
> PKIX.  I believe it does indeed.
> 
> It follows that things like CT that we're applying to PKIX should be
> applied to DNSSEC as well, where possible.
> 
> I don't see any reason why CT couldn't be extended to DNSSEC.  IMO, it
> should be done.
> 
> Note that DNSSEC needs CT independently of protocols like DANE, but
> any protocol that allows a DNSSEC MITM to bypass PKIX CT (as DANE
> effectively does) should increase the need for CT for DNSSEC.
> 
> Note too that I'm not in any way saying that DANE and similar should
> block on CT for DNSSEC.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Nico
> --
> 
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