Re: [Trans] DNSSEC also needs CT

Stephen Kent <> Thu, 22 May 2014 17:21 UTC

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Date: Thu, 22 May 2014 13:21:45 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Trans] DNSSEC also needs CT
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> DNSSEC is a PKI [of sorts; please, no need to pick nits about that].
> It stands to reason that DNSSEC should have similar trust problems as
> PKIX.  I believe it does indeed.
PKIX, per se, does not have the trust problems that seem to motivate
CT; the Web PKI does. That PKI has always had a serious problem because
any TA can issue a cert for any Subject, irrespective of the Subject name.
because DNSSEC intrinsically incorporate the equivalent of PKIX Name
Constraints, it does not suffer from that specific problem. That's not to
say that mis-issuance is not possible in DNSSEC, but rather that its
effects are more limited.
> It follows that things like CT that we're applying to PKIX should be
> applied to DNSSEC as well, where possible.
> I don't see any reason why CT couldn't be extended to DNSSEC.  IMO, it
> should be done.
I'll defer to DNS experts on that.