Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Tue, 16 September 2014 14:22 UTC

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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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Dmitry,
> My fault. The certs with unnecessery permissions are a subject to be 
> Monitored, not Audited.
no problem.
>
> There is a high-level description of the Auditors here: 
> http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct:
> =====
> Auditors are lightweight software components that typically perform 
> two functions. First, they can verify that logs are behaving correctly 
> and are cryptographically consistent. If a log is not behaving 
> properly, then the log will need to explain itself or risk being shut 
> down. Second, they can verify that a particular certificate appears in 
> a log. This is a particularly important auditing function because the 
> Certificate Transparency framework requires that all SSL certificates 
> be registered in a log. If a certificate has not been registered in a 
> log, it's a sign that the certificate is suspect, and TLS clients may 
> refuse to connect to sites that have suspect certificates.
> =====
> It is not integrated as a part of neither RFC 6962 nor current draft, 
> but it provides a high-level explanation of the Auditors' role.
Until this text is part of an IETF document, it doesn't enter into our 
discussion :-).

Frankly it seems a bit counterproductive to have a separate site where 
info about CT is
being posted, while we try to discuss 69269-bis in this WG.

Steve