Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation
Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com> Wed, 25 September 2019 16:58 UTC
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From: Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2019 17:58:18 +0100
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To: Rob Stradling <rob@sectigo.com>
Cc: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietf@sleevi.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation
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Rob, what leads you to say that "6962-bis has an effective MUST NOT" regarding the CA not having to provide status information for a 6962-bis precertificate? I agree it'd be helpful to add a clarification in 6962-bis regarding CAs possibly being asked about revocation status of a not-yet-issued certificate. I just want to understand where 6962-bis prevents CAs from publishing revocation info for 6962-bis precerts. On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 12:21 PM Rob Stradling <rob@sectigo.com> wrote: > If 6962-bis says nothing about this topic, then ISTM that the default > effective requirement will be that a CA MUST NOT provide OCSP status for > a (CT v2) precertificate where the corresponding certificate has not > (yet) been issued. This is because, whichever way you look at it, a CT > v2 precertificate is not a "certificate" according to > RFC5280/RFC6960/RFC5019. > > I agree that a statement such as "CAs MUST provide OCSP status for CT v2 > precertificates" would not belong in 6962-bis, but would instead belong > in a TLS client policy document. However, I would prefer to avoid the > situation where 6962-bis has an effective MUST NOT but where (some, but > not necessarily all) TLS client policies have a MUST. In order to avoid > such a conflict, I think it would be helpful for 6962-bis to outline the > policy space by making the following points: > > 1. Since issuance of a precertificate `P` is a binding commitment to > issue a corresponding certificate `C`, monitors may reasonably assume > that `C` has been issued. > 2. It follows that monitors may wish to request status information > (e.g., via CRL and/or OCSP) for the serial number of `P`, even though > (unbeknownst to the monitor) `C` has not actually been issued. > 3. Although `P` is not a "certificate" according to > RFC5280/RFC6960/RFC5019, some TLS clients may have policies that require > CAs to provide certificate status (e.g., signed OCSP responses and/or > CRLs) for the serial number of `P`, regardless of whether or not `C` has > been issued. > > Making these points would transform 6962-bis's effective requirement > from a MUST NOT into a MAY. A TLS client policy could then profile that > to a MUST without introducing any conflict. > > ISTM that this approach of outlining the policy space but not setting > policy would be consistent with, for example, > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-33#section-6.1. > > On 20/09/2019 17:16, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > As I mentioned elsewhere, I'm not sure this is an entirely useful or > > productive concern to be raising at this time. I have also shared that I > > think this is a question of policy than protocol, even though the policy > > decision has implications on other protocols. Thus I think it's much > > more appropriately discussed among individual implementations. > > > > As a protocol for allowing both the pre-disclosure of a certificate and > > post-disclosure of a certificate. We saw, rather extensively in the > > Threat Model document, different perspectives on policies regarding how > > pre-disclosure should be treated and handled. For example, using the > > protocol in 6962 or -bis, it's possible to use CT as a means of > > detecting and correcting certificates prior to issuance (the discussion > > about Logs applying rules to certificates). Similarly, it's possible for > > CT as a protocol to be used entirely internal to an organization, as > > part of audit logging for external audits via a common protocol, even > > with the inclusion of data that might otherwise be inappropriate for > > publicly-exposed logs. > > > > So I do think that, from the point of view of the RFCs, it's a matter of > > policy as to how the existence of a pre-certificate is treated, which > > aligns with the particular intended deployment of the CT protocol. If a > > policy (e.g. by a browser, for the Web PKI) treats the issuance of a > > pre-certificate as an unrebuttable proof of an equivalent certificate, > > which is certainly one of the core things CT enables policy to state, > > then it naturally follows that it must be treated as such within > > protocols that are keyed on the issuance of certificates. > > > > It's an operational concern, defined by local policy, as to what impact, > > if any, it has on other protocols. Just as RFC 5280 does not define, for > > example, what forms of names to include within a distinguished name, I'm > > not convinced that this would even belong in 6962-bis, because it covers > > the operational aspects and implications of a PKI that may use, in part > > or whole, these RFCs. > > -- > Rob Stradling > Senior Research & Development Scientist > Sectigo Limited > > _______________________________________________ > Trans mailing list > Trans@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans >
- [Trans] Precertificates and revocation Rob Stradling
- Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation Erwann Abalea
- Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation Rob Stradling
- Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation Eran Messeri
- Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation Rob Stradling
- Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation Rob Stradling
- Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation Eran Messeri
- Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation Rob Stradling
- Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation Rob Stradling
- Re: [Trans] Precertificates and revocation Paul Wouters