[Trans] Relaxing section 5.1

Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> Wed, 02 November 2016 02:19 UTC

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From: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 01 Nov 2016 19:19:40 -0700
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Subject: [Trans] Relaxing section 5.1
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Currently 6962bis section 5.1 says:

  "Logs MUST verify that each submitted certificate or precertificate
   has a valid signature chain to an accepted trust anchor, using the
   chain of intermediate CA certificates provided by the submitter. [...]
   logs MUST reject submissions without a
   valid signature chain to an accepted trust anchor.  Logs MUST also
   reject precertificates that do not conform to the requirements in
   Section 3.2."

Is there a reason this is enshrined as a MUST?  It seems like it
should be up to the log operator to determine their policy.  For
example, a log operator might want to add a feature to accept
certificates which have incomplete chains and have the log add the
missing links from data it already has or a log operator may want to
allow logging of certificates that are also published for DANE with
TLSA records with certificate usage 2 or 3.  It feels very restrictive
to require that every log only accept certificates that follow the
traditional hierarchical PKI model.

I can see value in providing guidance of what a log MAY want to do.
However requiring such seems to limit the potential of transparency in
undesirable ways.