Re: [Trans] DNSSEC also needs CT

[Paul Wouters <[e-mail]>]

On Sat, 10 May 2014, Warren Kumari wrote:

> On Fri, May 9, 2014 at 7:29 PM, Nico Williams <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> On Fri, May 9, 2014 at 6:12 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> The simplest way to align things is to simply have a certificate
>>> issued for the DNSSEC zone KSK and plop that in the log as normal.
>>
>> Sure, each zone acts as a CA for its children.  That works, I think.

The problem with that approach is that it does not make DNSSEC distinct
from the existing CA PKI. It will also not remove the cost factor of
getting a DNSSEC "certificate" from a "certified" CABforum member.

> I have previously had some discussions about including DNSSEC / DANE /
> self signed certs -- one of the objections / concerns was the threat
> of someone DoSing the logs by making up data (there is a cost to a CA
> cert, but I can create an infinite number of TLSA records or self
> signed certs).

Cost should IMHO not become a verification factor. That's the whole
reason https hasn't been universally deployed to begin with. We should
not make the same mistake with DNSSEC.

> The main incentive (that I can see) to DoS the logs would be for the
> lolz[0], and so (IMO) the protection does not need to be very strong -
> having someone have to solve a captcha or make a small payment (could
> become a donation) would be enough.

Or just say that anyone who puts in more than X amount of DNSSEC CT
entries underneath themselves must run a public CT node themselves. So
if nohats.ca want to get more then X entries, or one of their
subzones/customers wants more than X entries, either they or their
subzone/customer will have to run a fully functional CT node. And if
the node goes down, their new entries will be refused.

Paul