Re: [Trans] [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US government possible?
Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 31 July 2014 19:44 UTC
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Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 14:44:15 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Cc: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>, John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>, dane@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US government possible?
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On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote: > That's what transaparancy for DNSSEC is about that is being discussed in > the trans working group now. It's stil in the preliminairy stages, and > likely will take a back seat to the more urgent certificate transparency > which needs an audit log much more than DNSSEC. And which is a good chance to remind everyone that this topic is off-topic here. This should be discussed there [trans]. Nico --
- Re: [Trans] [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US g… Nico Williams