Re: [Trans] On the worthiness of DNSSEC and PKI (Re: DNSSEC also needs CT)

Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> Sat, 10 May 2014 03:37 UTC

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From: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
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Date: Fri, 9 May 2014 22:37:01 -0500
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To: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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Cc: "Mehner, Carl" <Carl.Mehner@usaa.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Trans] On the worthiness of DNSSEC and PKI (Re: DNSSEC also needs CT)
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Hi Melinda,

> Right now there's a proposal to look at the possibility of
> applying CT to DNSSEC.  A general discussion of "the worthiness of
> DNSSEC and PKI" doesn't really go to that proposal.

Understood! (FTR, I didn't come up with that subject title. ^_^)

> We kept the therightkey@ietf.org mailing list around for discussions
> of just this nature, and I'd be grateful if you could keep the
> discussion here focused on the applicability of CT to DNSSEC and
> take the more general discussion over there.

Pointing out security and design flaws in CT is off-topic, noted, thanks.

Kind regards,
Greg

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Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.