Re: [Trans] White out (was Re: Reviving Redaction)
Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietf@sleevi.com> Mon, 06 March 2017 23:46 UTC
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From: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietf@sleevi.com>
Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2017 18:46:15 -0500
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To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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Cc: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>, Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley@digicert.com>
Subject: Re: [Trans] White out (was Re: Reviving Redaction)
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On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 6:30 PM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote: > I think the "white out" proposal that was discussed at the CT Policy Days > is likely to be far more controversial than the various redaction proposals. > > "White out" proposes a mechanism for removing or omitting entire > certificates from logs whilst still "proving" that those certificates are > "included". Relying parties have to trust the log to only "white out" > certs for good reasons. ISTM that this defeats most of the purpose of CT! > > From https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-1... > "Certificate transparency aims to mitigate the problem of misissued > certificates by providing publicly auditable, append-only, untrusted > logs of all issued certificates." > > ISTM that supporting "white out" would turn that sentence into this... > "Certificate transparency aims to mitigate the problem of misissued > certificates by providing publicly auditable, modifiable, trusted > logs of some issued certificates." > > That sounds not too dissimilar to the WebPKI minus CT! > Indeed. I think the takeaway from the proposed solution is that it undermines the goals of CT to provide the ability to later 'remove' certificates (by effectively inserting a later node in the tree that includes sufficient data to recreate the Merkle Tree, by providing its hash, while refusing to provide that entry to clients). This is the question of whether to solve this problem technologically - if it is even possible (and full disclosure, like Rob states, I believe this seriously undermines the security guarantees) - or whether through policy. The policy approach is simply to shut the log down, should it ever need to violate the append-only property, thereby avoiding any particular notion of additional trustworthiness. This then becomes an 'implementation guidance' aspect, as clients, monitor/auditors, and CAs must all be prepared to adjust to changes in trusted logs commiserate to their belief such a mechanism is necessary/appropriate. That is, if implementations do not believe there exists a need to 'remove' certificates, or are willing and able to tolerate the disappearance of a log, then no further action is necessary.
- [Trans] Reviving Redaction Peter Bowen
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Salz, Rich
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Peter Bowen
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Salz, Rich
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Andrew Ayer
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Eric Mill
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Rob Stradling
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Ben Laurie
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Peter Bowen
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Ben Laurie
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Rob Stradling
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Jeremy Rowley
- [Trans] White out (was Re: Reviving Redaction) Rob Stradling
- Re: [Trans] White out (was Re: Reviving Redaction) Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [Trans] White out (was Re: Reviving Redaction) Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [Trans] White out (was Re: Reviving Redaction) Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [Trans] White out (was Re: Reviving Redaction) Rob Stradling
- Re: [Trans] White out (was Re: Reviving Redaction) Ben Laurie
- Re: [Trans] White out (was Re: Reviving Redaction) Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Peter Bowen
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [Trans] Reviving Redaction Peter Bowen