Re: [trill] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-trill-arp-optimization-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com> Mon, 02 October 2017 19:48 UTC

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From: Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2017 15:47:47 -0400
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-trill-arp-optimization@ietf.org, "trill-chairs@ietf.org" <trill-chairs@ietf.org>, Susan Hares <skh@ndzh.com>, "trill@ietf.org" <trill@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [trill] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-trill-arp-optimization-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hi Eric,

On Mon, Oct 2, 2017 at 2:12 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 2, 2017 at 4:54 PM, Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Eric,
>>
>>
...
>>
>> >> > It's not clear to me how the security properties of this mechanism
>> >> > compare to existing TRILL. The text says:
>> >> >
>> >> >    Unless Secure ND (SEND [RFC3971]) is used, ARP and ND messages can
>> >> > be
>> >> >    easily forged. Therefore the learning of MAC/IP addresses by
>> >> > RBridges
>> >> >    from ARP/ND should not be considered as reliable. See Section 4.1
>> >> > for
>> >> >    SEND Considerations.
>> >> >
>> >> > "not considered as reliable" seems suboptimal. You need to cover how
>> >> > this mechanism compares to the non-use of this mechanism.
>> >>
>> >> As above, the optimization mechanisms do not make any significant
>> >> difference to the inherent insecurities of data plane learning but when
>> >> used
>> >> with a complete, trusted directory, it improves considerably over data
>> >> plane
>> >> learning..
>> >
>> > That had kind of been my impression, but then I don't understand what
>> > "not
>> > considered as reliable" is doing here. I'm supposed to be doing
>> > something
>> > with it, so while it may be non-secure, I'm still relying on it, no?
>>
>> Well, at some level some elements of your protocol stack are "relying"
>> on it or "trusting" it or whatever term you want, but it's trivially
>> forged unless you use additional security protocols so I guess we
>> could say something about that. TRILL supports different link
>> technologies but if you are using an Ethernet link, I suppose you
>> could use 802.1AE to improve trust in MAC addresses at layer 2. It
>> wouldn't hurt to mention that but it has very little to do with ARP/ND
>> optimization or TRILL.
>
>
> I think if you just sort of say "you are using it, but it's not trustworthy
> and here's why" you have it covered.

OK.

Thanks,
Donald
===============================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-333-2270 (cell)
 155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA
 d3e3e3@gmail.com

> -Ekr